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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
On the Role of Sublimation in the Works of Gabriele Reuter
by
Maria Skene-Björkman
Master of Arts in Germanic Languages and Literatures
Washington University in St. Louis, 2015
Professor Lynne Tatlock, Chair
In my thesis I discuss the relationship between Nietzsche’s concept of amor fati (love of fate)
and Lacan’s understanding of sublimation through the lens of selected works by Gabriele Reuter.
I argue that Reuter deploys an understanding of will power that draws on the Nietzschean
concept of amor fati, which ultimately serves the function of sublimation as discussed by Lacan.
In their respective efforts at establishing their own identities, the female protagonists in Reuter’s
novels have to learn to overcome their sufferings, and in doing so they transform the process of
identity formation into a life-affirming enterprise in the spirit of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra.
Language, or the symbolic order, serves as an instrumental tool for identity formation according
to Lacan, whereby the father as the ultimate signifier serves as the law for symbolic order, or
discourse. To become women on their own terms, all three female protagonists discussed in the
thesis must break with the Name-of-the-Father – a Lacanian term discussed at length in the thesis
– and enter into discourse as subjects with a sense of self separate from the physical and
symbolic power represented by the father.
v

Chapter 1: Introduction
Gabriele Reuter (1859-1941) was a German author and convinced Nietzschean who became
famous overnight with the publication of her novel, Aus guter Familie (1895). In her portrayal of
the unassuming protagonist Agathe Heidling, Reuter tells the tragic story of a young bourgeois
woman suffering from great mental anguish and pain over the consequences of oppressive and
unjust gender relations. Agathe restlessly attempts to live up to the expectations of those in her
social milieu, while simultaneously wishing to break with norms that she finds degrade women
of their status as individuals, and ultimately, human beings. As suggested by Lisbeth Hock in
“Shades of Melancholy in Gabriele Reuter’s ‘Aus guter Familie,’” “Agathe, too, is far more
aware of the contradictions and hypocrisy of her society than her family and friends, and yet, as
the reader realizes throughout the text, she is also excessively hard on herself” (457).
To resolve the conflicts evolving between the societal expectation that lead Agathe to
model her behavior around virtues such as selflessness, modesty, and chastity and her own desire
to find a language expressive of her intense emotional character, the protagonist of Aus guter
Familie embarks on a path of conformity that gives rise to inner turmoil and conflict. In the
words of the narrator of Aus guter Familie and in reference to Agathe: “Nicht in keuscher
Unschuld – denn sie war kein Kind mehr – sie war erwacht, ein reifes, temperamentvolles Weib.
Ihr Phantasie – und Gefühlsleben war nicht mehr unschuldig. Es war nur ein fortwährender Streit
zwischen ihrer individuellen Natur und dem Wesen, zu dem sie sich in liebendem Eifer nach
einem ehrwürdigen, jahrtausenden alten Ideal gemodelt hatte” (131).
The consequences of conformity lead to a series of nervous ailments, including agitation,
exhaustion, and sleeplessness. As noted by Hock, the source of these ailments is not identified in
1

the novel. Instead, “By leaving illnesses unnamed, Reuter’s texts encourage an exploration of
assumptions about the relationships among health, illness, society, and culture” (446). In other
words, we may claim that the very nature of the relationship between psychological sickness,
gender, and social standing is at the center of Reuter’s writing in Aus guter Familie. Listening to
the advice of a medical professor who attends to Agathe after a period of illness, our protagonist
accepts the doctor’s words that the cure to her condition lies in the exercise of will power: “Ihr
Fräulein Tochter is sehr sensibel … Ihre Gesundheit, liebes Fräulein, ist in Ihre Hand gelegt.
Geben Sie sich heiteren Eindrücken hin, genießen Sie Ihre Jugend” (103).
The reader’s ability to understand Agathe’s failure to use her will power in order, in the
words of Hock, to “transform her temperamental qualities into a productive force,” and her
succumbing to madness instead relies on his/her grasp of Reuter’s depiction of the dangers of
conformity (456). Reuter’s appreciation of the liberating potential of Nietzsche’s philosophy is
evident in the recurrent use of will power as a literary trope and imaginative force or impetus in
the portrayal of numerous female characters, including but not restriced to Agathe. To make it in
the world, and stay true to themselves, these female characters have to fight and overcome oldfashioned gender norms. Agathe’s mistake is not that she is born a woman, or that she longs for
the freedom to express her passionate nature, but that she fails to assert her will.
In her article, Hock makes a convincing argument for understanding Agathe’s condition,
and ultimately her failure to assert her will power, as the result of melancholia:
if one follows the development of Agathe’s symptoms from her adolescent brooding and
sadness to her later sleeplessness, anxiety, and violent aggression, and finally to the
vacuousness with which she is to live out the second half of her life, and compares them
to the medical literature of her day, it would appear that Reuter wrote a clinicallyaccurate description of a young woman suffering from melancholia. (252)
2

There are numerous accounts of sadness, anxiety, sleeplessness, and aggression on the part of the
protagonist in Aus guter Familie; too many to list here, that serve as support for Hock’s
argument. Even if one does not agree with the assessment of Agathe’s condition offered by
Hock, the reference to melancholia and how it is treated by Freud provides a helpful framework
for discussing the consequences of conformity. But, as cautioned by Hock, it is to misconstrue
Agathe’s efforts to break with the expectations of her social milieu to conceive of her biological
predicament as the reason behind her (mental) illness. The pressure to conform is too strong, and
Agathe’s failure serves as a critique of societal norms that prevent women like our protagonist
from finding a meaningful purpose in life outside of marriage.
To further understand the dangers associated with conformity for women in patriarchal
societies as portrayed by Reuter and discussed by Hock, we are helped by looking beyond
Freud’s account of melancholia as a specifically female illness, to include discussions of Lacan’s
understanding of psychosis as a specific kind of “language entrapment.”1 The consideration of
Agathe’s condition as a case of psychosis allows for the inclusion of discussions concerned with
the relationship between language, discourse, and identity. As a means to bridge the gap between
self and Other, home and family, language according to Lacan is fundamental to subjectformation. Without language, outside of discourse, one is bereft of the unifying principle that
situates human beings as subjects and individuals. Thus, without inclusion and access to an
expressive language of some sort, human beings are prevented from knowing themselves and
others.

The term ”language entrapment” is used by John Forrester in the opening remark’s of Lacan’s seminar on
psychosis, and it refers to the psychotic’s problematic relationship to language. This topic is discussed in detail in
chapter 1, ”Psychosis and sublimation in Aus Guter Familie”.
1
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The absence of an expressive language leads not only to the breakdown of
communication, but, as in Agathe’s case, a disintegration of self, which might be understood as
the consequence of psychosis. By reading Agathe’s fate through the lens of the Lacanian concept
of psychosis we arrive at an understanding of why the Nietzschean concept of will (to) power is
not enough to help her overcome the expectations of her social milieu. From the opening scene
of Aus guter Familie -- describing Agathe and her family on the day of her Confirmation -- to the
final pages depicting our protagonist as a numb, mindless woman living in the company of her
father, we witness how -- time and again -- Agathe’s will is broken. Succumbing to sickness at
the end of the novel, Agathe is without any desire or passion to will or live.
Agathe’s life story contrasts with the story of Ellen, another of Reuter’s characters
important to our discussion. Like Agathe, Ellen is of a passionate nature. However, Ellen, unlike
Agathe, succeeds in breaking with some of society’s expectations and living her life in
accordance with her own convictions. She, and Cornelie, the protagonist of Das Tränenhaus –
the third of Reuter’s novels to be discussed here – share the same fate: pregnancy out of
wedlock. As will become evident, Ellen and Cornelie experience rejection and a great deal of
disapproval, and thus suffering, as a consequence of their pregnancies. It is only by exerting will
power to an extreme extent that these two characters overcome the prejudices of their time, and
survive in the world.
Characteristic for Ellen and Cornelie, setting them apart from Agathe, is their inclusion in
the world of social order; defined as discourse by Lacan. They have access to the symbolic order,
enabling them to share and discuss with other women the traumatic experience of childbirth out
of wedlock. Consequently, these two female characters appear not only as strong willed, but as
equipped with language as a mean to articulate the traumatic events following upon unwanted
4

pregnany, preventing them from falling into an abyss of sorrow and madness. But, their inclusion
into the social order, and thus language, does not preclude Ellen and Cornelie from experiencing
feelings of despair, hopelessness, and depression. Their emotional reactions are similar to
Agathe’s in so far as all three female characters are overcome by sadness to such an extent that it
threatens to ruin them. Ellen and Cornelie, however, find constructive ways to overcome their
melancholy.
In order to understand the mechanism in place in the handling of trauma by Ellen and
Cornelie, we will employ the Nietzschean concept of amor fati; understood by Reuter as the
ecstasy of suffering the inequalities of gender norms by transforming the negative experiences
into something willed, and ultimately positive. Agathe fails to make the transition or change of
perspectives associated with amor fati. Instead, she regards the misfortunes of her life as the
consequence of her own actions, i.e., as a failure to will what she desires. Consequently, she
blames herself for her failure to break with the expectations of her social milieu, turning the
creative forces of melancholy into self-destruction and, ultimately, psychosis.
Ellen and Cornelie suffer as well. However, unlike Agathe, they transform the negative
circumstances of their respective lives into language, and thus, into a shared experience. Through
great suffering they find the willpower to overcome the obstacles that prevent them from living
as strong, independent women in the world. Thus, they become who they are not in spite of but
because of the pain and rejection they face. As taught by Zarathustra and exemplified by Ellen
and Cornelie, to break with the norms of society and become an Übermensch, one must test
one’s convictions and beliefs against norms or moral measuring sticks created by oneself.
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Men, not God, judge each other, and society is nothing but a man-made institution
created by and for human beings who cannot act as their own judge. The Übermensch, however,
is a man with a strong will (to) power who reigns over his own actions and judgments - with or
without the approval of society. Ultimately, we may consider the act of employing Nietzsche’s
concept of the Übermensch in relation to women an example of such overcoming, for it is not at
all clear that Nietzsche ever intended it to apply to other subjects than male ones.
For the followers of the Übermensch, who embrace Nietzsche’s teaching of the
redemptive powers of willing in relation to great suffering, factors such as society’s approval or
rejection matter less than a truthful life. To be truthful to oneself, one must learn to love what
one cannot initially endure, whereby amor fati, or love of one’s fate, becomes a life-affirming
practice situating each subject as his own commander. In situations in which one’s experiences
are not the results of one’s own actions, or will, but due to circumstances, a special burden is laid
upon the individual for forming the outlines of his/her life, and destiny. What to make out of this
negative experience lies in the hand of the subject, no matter how extreme the apparent negative
is. To overcome and break with conventions and thus act as one’s own commander and judge,
the subject aspiring to be an Übermensch must will the negative without changing it.
In conversation with Cornelie, one of the women at the establishment for unmarried
pregnant women where she stays summarizes in a few sentences the significance of amor fati as
a life affirming practice. Considering the pertinence of amor fati to the approach I suggest in
understanding the outcome of Ellen and Cornelie’s actions I include the words uttered in the
exchange between the two women. Thereby, I hope to foreground the fatal nature ascribed to the
pressure to conform facing all three characters discussed in this thesis, as well as their desire to
be true to themselves:
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Das wird nicht von dem individuellen Willen bestimmt, sondern durch Bedingungen,
über die wir gar keine Gewalt haben. Darum tun wir wohl so oft Dinge, von denen wir
fühlen, wir tun sie aus einem Zwang, der gegen unsere individuelle Natur ist. Das
Schicksal hat manche unter uns ausersehen zu Symbolen der Zeit. Wir tragen ihr
Brandmal oder ihre Flammenzunge an der Stirne – wissen nicht, ob das feurige Zeichen
Schande oder Ehre bedeutet ... Wer einmal so gezeichnet wurde, der muss sein Los auf
sich nehmen und seine letzten Bitterkeiten austrinken. Er wird ahnen, dass nur auf diesem
Wege sein Leben reif werden kann, zu einer Frucht am Erntekranz der Zeit. (162)
The appeal to endure the pains of life associated with the Übermensch has clear affinities with
the call to “take up one’s cross” in the Christian tradition. Unlike Christians, however, Cornelie,
does not believe in “einen persönlichen Gott” (162). Cornelie’s rejection of God is not in and of
itself a sign of her leaving her Christian tradition behind. To proclaim that there is no God does
not prevent our protagonist from believing in some kind of Divine Providence, referred to as the
Divine (in German “das Göttliche”): “Ahnen wir in seltenen Augenblicken das Gesetz unsres
eignen Lebens, müssen wir uns ihm beugen, wenn es auch noch so erschreckend droht. Denn es
ist doch das Göttliche …” (163).
Notice here the word “beugen” or “bend.” A burden, in Biblical terms a cross, loaded
onto one’s back will bend one down. Cornelie suggests we accept this burden, no matter how
heavy or terrifying it is, as the workings of the Divine, and thus as our destiny. At first glance her
approach to the Divine seems to suggest that there is little or no agency, or willpower, on the part
of humankind. One must accept the yoke on one’s shoulders. The solution to this conflict, which
shows how influenced Cornelie, and ultimately Reuter is by Nietzsche’s concept of amor fati,
lies in the recognition that without personal interference from a divine God, one is empowered to
change the circumstances of one’s life to the best of one’s capabilities without fear of facing
Divine wrath or punishment.
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On a personal, individual level, the insight into the mechanics of a divine principle that is
impersonal, and thus unaffected by one’s beliefs or actions, evokes a different sense of
responsibility than if one is faced with an erratic, all-encompassing God who answers to no one
but Himself. Cornelie, in coming to the recognition that she no longer believed in a personal
God, felt nothing like remorse, emptiness or loss, but relief: “Und es war eine Erlösung, als ich
diesen Glauben endlich von mir tun konnte” (162). Casting aside the shackles of the Christian
tradition with its belief in the Holy Trinity, Cornelie is free to be her own person, and ultimately
her own judge. She thereby accomplishes what Agathe did not achieve: to distance herself from a
tradition that is inherently patriarchal and views women as followers, not leaders. In my thesis, I
argue that Cornelie shares the desire to overcome the obstacles of narrow gender norms to live in
the world as a free and independent woman with Ellen, and that Agathe, as a consequence of
pressure, breaks down before she has the chance to live her life fully. However, Agathe is not to
be read merely as an anti-hero or as radically different from Ellen and Cornelie, but as someone
on the fringes of life, struggling to join the lines of women like Ellen and Cornelie.
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Chapter 2: Psychosis and Sublimation in Aus
Guter Familie
In the opening scene of Aus guter Familie, the main protagonist Agathe Heidling receives
Communion in the company of her father, mother, and older brother. Conducting the
Communion is Pastor Kandler, a friend of the family and the clergyman preparing Agathe for
Confirmation. When Agathe returned from the boarding school just a few months earlier, her
father was not pleased with his daughter’s disposition and decided that a stay in the countryside
under the supervision of a man of God would help restore Agathe’s spirits and prepare her for
life as a young woman:
Agathe war frisch und stark und rosig geworden in dem stillen Winter, bei den
Schlittenfahrten über die beschneiten Felder, in der klaren, herben Landluft. Sein Kind
hatte ihm nicht gefallen, als es aus der Pension kam. Etwas Zerfahrenes, Eitles,
Schwatzhaftes war damals an ihr aufgefallen. Nur das nicht! Er stellte ideale Forderungen
an die Frau. (7)
Confirmation marks a transition or rite-de-passage from adolescence to adulthood. By accepting
Communion, Agathe and her peers swear to accept and follow the word of God as his loyal,
chaste servants. But, even as she is called upon to abstain from all earthly desires that are not in
accordance with the teachings of the church and to refrain from sin, Agathe is preoccupied with
thoughts about what she considers past immoral desires and fantasies. While producing a written
confession, mandatory for all adolescents before partaking in Communion, Agathe decides to
leave out these mental images from her statement. Unwilling to share the nature or magnitude of
her wrongdoings, the protagonist cringes with fear and disgust at the mere thought of them: “Der
Schweiß brach ihr aus, so peinigte sie die Scham. Das konnte sie doch nicht aufschreiben.
Tausendmal lieber in die Hölle!” (2).
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Agathe, who is fearful but determined to honor and obey the calling of God and the Christian
community, is overcome by feelings of doubt as well as pressing urgency: “Alles war so
geheimnißvoll schrecklich bei diesem christlichen Glaubensleben. Sie wollte es ja annehmen…
Und sie hatte ja auch gelobt – nun mußte sie – da half ihr nichts mehr!” (2).
Unable to comprehend fully the significance of Confirmation, Agathe understands that,
as a rite-of-passage, it implies a change in life that comes with new and challenging demands.
However, on the day of Confirmation, while in church, Agathe experiences a moment of clarity
that causes her to shiver with fear. In this moment of insight the protagonist is blinded by the sun
shining through the windows of the church, brightening up the interior dim space to such an
extent that Agathe’s vision is temporarily transfixed: “Das Licht der hohen Wachskerzen
flackerte unruhig. Agathe schloß geblendet die Augen vor dem hellen Sonnenschein, der die
Kerze durchströmte, und in dem Milliarden Staubatome wirbelten. War die Himmelssonne nur
dazu da, alles Verborgene zu schrecklicher Klarheit zu bringen?” (2).
Penetrating the darkness of the candle-lit church, the beams of the sun have an almost
disturbing effect, suggested by the restless flickering of the candles, forcing the female
protagonist to close her eyes. When she opens her eyes again, her vision is blurred and as an
effect thereof the sunrays appear atomized and broken down into millions of fragments of dust.
The materiality of the candles is hereby juxtaposed to the breaking down of immaterial light into
dead matter. In this process of deconstruction, Agathe is given another (inner) vision or
perspective that causes her spirit to flicker like candlelight. Illuminated by the sun, she fears that
God will find her unworthy of acceptance due to the hidden desires and untold secrets she
harbors. Thus, she dreads the upcoming symbolic consumption of Christ’s blood and body that,
in her opinion, can be followed only by the wrath of God and his community of dutiful followers
10

on account of perjury. However, feelings of shame and fear are soon overcome by a deep sense
of gratitude and love:
Nun war es nicht der erhabene Gott-Vater, der das Opfer forderte, nicht mehr der heilige
Geist, der unbegreiflich-furchtbare, der mit den Gluten des ewigen Feuers seinen
Beleidigern droht, der nicht vergiebt – jetzt nahte der himmlische Bräutigam mit Trost
und Liebe. . . . Ein schmachtendes Begehren nach der geheimnisvollen Vereinigung mit
ihm durchzitterte die Nerven des jungen Weibes. Der starke Wein rann feurig durch ihren
erschöpften Körper – ein sanftes, zärtliches und doch entsagungsvolles Glück durchbebte
ihr Innerstes – sie war würdig befunden, seine Gegenwart zu fühlen. (3)
Here the metaphor of light is replaced by fire and the notion of lucidity with the consumption of
self through fire. Agathe is relieved to have escaped the unnerving sensations associated with the
fear of being found unworthy of God’s love. Instead, she enjoys the more pleasurable glow of
consumption as consummation and delivery, basking in the realization of her redemption in the
eyes of the all-knowing and all-seeing God as Father. When she drinks the wine offered to her,
the spirit of the Holy Father fills her with excitement, and in his presence she feels regenerated
and purified. In this instance portrayed as a divine lover and bridegroom, God offers Agathe
support and shelter. She falls on her knees and accepts Jesus Christ and the Holy God as her
savior and commander.
With Communion simultaneously marking a continuation as well as a break with life as
the female protagonist knows it, the implications of sunlight as a metaphor for insight or change
of perspective, in my reading, not only forehadow the tragic outcome of the novel but highlight
one of its main conflicts and structuring principles: the struggle between father and daughter,
man and woman. The problematic nature of gender and generational relations is resolved in the
opening scene of Aus guter Familie by means of sublimation as a way of dealing with sexual
awakening and bourgeoning romantic desire: a strategy that eventually (in the second half of the
novel) proves insufficient for the protagonist in dealing with the expectations of her social
11

milieu. Especially the role played by the father as authoritative figure represents an obstacle in
Agathe’s coming into herself as a young woman. The father’s influence on how the protagonist
views her role as daughter and woman is indicated in the opening quotation of this chapter, as
well as in the scene on the day of Confirmation.
During the celebratory dinner for Agathe’s family hosted by Pastor Kandler and his wife
it is revealed to the reader that the shameful actions causing the protagonist to tremble with fear
upon partaking in Communion are of a romantic nature. Actions, which to a twenty-first century reader may seem trivial or the mere product of Agathe’s imagination, lead to
disagreement between Agathe and her father and Pastor Kandler. The source of the dispute is a
book of poems sent to Agathe by her cousin Martin. The title of the book is Herwegs Gedichte,
by Georg Herweg: a poet known for his involvement in the revolution of 1848 whose poems
were banned in Prussia.
The two male authorities present at dinner are outraged at the sight of the book. Agathe,
who is unable to make the connection between the political message of the poems and its critique
of men in social positions represented by her father and the host, blushes out of gratitude and joy.
The poems are a reminder of the summer she spent together with Martin, reading poetry and
discussing politics, revolution and personal freedom. Too engrossed in the book, Agathe does not
notice the silence spreading over the table. It is not until Pastor Kandler tears the book away
from her that she recognizes that something is wrong. Agathe, who is unable to comprehend the
reason behind the commotion, admits to having read the poems before and finding the language
“wunderschön” (9). The pastor asks the protagonist whether she recognizes that the contents of
the poems are in conflict with his instructions in preparation for Confirmation, whereupon
Agathe replies, “Nein – ich dachte, man sollte für seine Überzeugung kämpfen und sterben!”
12

(10). As indicated by this reply, the protagonist lacks a deeper understanding of the political
situation in the country and the ways in which Herweg’s poems are critical of a system upheld by
men such as her father and Pastor Kandler. To Agathe, the poems represent freedom as a
romantic enterprise undertaken by human beings, like herself and Martin, who are connected in
spirit by the same desire for justice and liberty. The political and social implications of
revolution are thus replaced by romantic feelings and thoughts, whereby sexual desire is
sublimated and represented in terms of spiritual liberation and freedom.
Agathe is discouraged by her father’s and Pastor Kandler’s reactions, and she represses
her anger and internalizes it in favor of the opinion represented by the two men: “Es war doch zu
schrecklich, daß sie heute, am Konfirmationstage, ihrem Pastor und ihrem Vater böse war! Hier
fing gewiß die Selbstüberwindung und die Entsagung an. Sie war doch noch recht dumm! Ein so
gefährliches Gift für schön zu halten… Aber so war es fortwährend: was einem gefiel, dem
mußte man mißtrauen” (11). Under the assumption that obedience and self-sacrifice is expected
by and of women and eventually rewarded, the young Agathe from this point on sets out on a
path of self-denial that in the end will lead to self-destruction. As noted by Lynne Tatlock in her
introduction to the English translation of Aus guter Familie, the tragic outcome of the novel is
the consequence of what “‘good girls’ might suffer as a result of their conforming” (xxiii).
Calling the young protagonist “an ordinary young woman,” Tatlock further emphasizes the
importance of socialization, gender and class to the tragic outcome of Agathe’s struggles (xxxii).
Although socialization and class are not the main focus of inquiry in this thesis, these
aspects of the female protagonist’s character should not go unnoticed. To understand better the
importance of socialization in Aus guter Familie and the ways in which it affects the process of
subject formation in Agathe, it is helpful to look more closely at the relationship between the role
13

of the father and language as discussed by Jacques Lacan in his Seminar III: The Psychosis,
1955-1956. In A Compendium of Lacanian Terms, Leonardo S. Rodriguez points to the central
position of the father in Lacan’s early work: “he [Lacan] linked contemporary forms of neurosis,
and the social conditions that made possible the very emergence of psychoanalysis, to the
problematic position of the father in our culture” (119). According to Rodriguez, in Lacan’s
conception of the paternal function, “the father operates as a signifier, that is, in the name of a
symbolic ideal position; and he also represents the law and its prohibition” (120). This “in the
name of a symbolic ideal position” primarily inhabited by the father is referred to by Lacan as
the-Name-of-the-Father. Russell Grigg, author of Lacan, Language and Philosophy and
translator of Lacan’s seminar XII on psychosis, refers to the father’s symbolic ideal position as a
“pure signifier [which] situates the the Name-of-the-Father in ‘prehistory’” (30). The term
“pure” refers to the fact that there is no representation correlative to the signifier, positioning the
Name-of-the-Father at the very beginning of the symbolic order, and thus language, as one of its
fundamental and structuring principals.
The primary function of the father in matters concerned with socialization does not
preclude the mother from playing an important role in the child’s early childhood as well as adult
life. As noted by Grigg, “One needs to consider the place that the mother, as the first object of
the child’s desire, gives to the authority of the father” (18). By charging other people with the
responsibility for preparing her daughter for life as a bourgeois woman, Mrs. Heidling has no or
very little control over Agathe’s coming into her own as a woman. The mother distances herself
from her daughter, and individuals outside of the family, mainly some of the girls at the boarding
school Agathe attends, assume the role of the mother, thus causing emotional detachment
between mother and daughter, and ultimately transference and homoerotic desire on Agathe’s
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part. The detachment in turn makes Agathe vulnerable not only to the influence of girls her own
age but especially to the authority of her father.
In his seminar on psychosis, Lacan introduces the concept of the Name-of-the-Father as a
strategic move in his opposition to what he considers to be over-emphasis of the exclusive
relationship of the individual and his/her mother in the Oedipus complex. Lacan emphasizes
instead the importance of the third party in the Oedipus complex – what he calls “the place that
she [the mother] reserves for the Name-of-the Father in the promulgation of the law” (Ecrits
218). Lacan sees the internalization of the Name-of-the-Father as a vital element for helping each
new member of the human race to move from an exclusive, primary relation to the mother to a
wider engagement with the outside, material and cultural world, also referred to as the symbolic
order.
Traditionally, and especially at the time in which Reuter was writing, the father is the
family member primarily responsible for the transition from home to society. As head of the
household and the main guardian, the father has responsibilities including all affairs and contact
with the domain outside the home, while the mother is primarily responsible for the domestic
order, of which caring for the children when they are young numbers among the main
responsibilities. While instructing boys and girls respectively in what is considered good
behavior and social conduct is part of the mother’s responsibility, teaching and training the
young to prepare them for conventional life as adults is ultimately the duty of the father. His law
overrides the authority of the mother. As the head of the household and the family, the father-both as authority and symbolic figure--inhabits a subject-position of power and influence, both
over the woman as wife and mother and the children as inheritors of the law laid down by him.
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In other words, the father is the ultimate referent or signifier, demanding symbolic recognition as
the representative and upholder of the social order.
To develop and inhabit one’s own subject position, the child needs to transition from the
sphere of the home and the parents to the social order of the world. For Lacan, this bigger
context could be seen as “the chain of discourse . . . in which an entire family, an entire coterie,
an entire camp, an entire nation or half the world will be caught” (Ecrit 89-90). The
internalization of the Name-of-the-Father with the passing of the Oedipus complex ensures, for
Lacan, participation in that wider chain of discourse. The power or influence of the actual father
is thus replaced by the symbolic father. The symbolic father is not an actual subject but a
position in the symbolic order, allowing for the substitution of the mother’s desire. He imposes
the law that regulates desire in the Oedipus complex, intervening in the imaginary dual
relationship between mother and child to introduce a necessary symbolic distance between them.
In the words of Rodriguez, “[A]s a result of this operation the subject ceases to be the phallus of
the mother, while for the mother it is no longer possible to have the child as her phallus” (120).
Psychosis for Lacan is the exact opposite of the Name-of-the-Father--the absence of the
identification with the symbolic order that ensures our place in the world. In Lacan’s
understanding, psychotics have not been properly separated from their mother by the fixed
Name-of-the-Father, hence they relate differently to speech and language from mere neurotics. In
the opening remarks to Lacan’s seminar on psychosis, John Forrester refers to the psychotic’s
relationship to language as “a specific but emblematic case of language entrapment”. Entrapment
here refers to the subject who “is ignorant of the language he speaks” (Seminar III 12). Unlike
cases of neurosis, in which the return of the repressed is structured like a language of symptoms
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that are cured through talking, psychosis appears when “whatever is refused in the symbolic
order, in the sense of Verwerfung, reappears in the real” (Seminar III 13).
Verwerfung is the very mechanism that distinguishes psychosis from neurosis. The
concept stems from Freud, and it was developed by Lacan, who exchanged Verwerfung for the
term foreclosure. Dominique Hecq offers the following definition of the Lacanian term
foreclosure:
While repression can be conceived as a bracketing of an experience that is structured, and
which is likely to return to consciousness, foreclosure radically crosses out what it rejects
because the psychotic has neither access to symbolization, nor to the judgment required
for this experience to be inscribed in the symbolic. Thus, foreclosure designates a process
of ‘symbolic abolition’ which precedes any possibility of repression. This, of course, has
disastrous consequences for the subject’s relations with language and with his or her own
body. (71)
In the case of psychosis we are dealing with individuals where the Name-of-the-Father has been
excluded from the symbolic; however, the absence of the signifier does not prevent the symbolic
from functioning altogether. In his seminar on psychosis Lacan frequently refers to the writings
of Daniel Schreber. Schreber was diagnosed with psychosis and throughout his life treated in
various clinics, yet there are few written reports on the development of his illness by the
numerous doctors who attended to him. Instead, there is a volume of about 500 pages produced
by the patient himself, in which he talks about the different stages of his illness.
As evidenced by Schreber’s productivity, he was very much situated within the symbolic.
But, as pointed out by Grigg, “the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father is accompanied by the
corresponding absence, foreclosure, of the phallic meaning that is necessary for libidinal
relations. Without this phallic meaning the subject is left prey to … the mother’s unregulated
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desire, confronted by an obscure enigma at the level of the Other’s jouissance that the subject
lacks the means to comprehend” (9-10).
The inability to comprehend the Other’s jouissance causes serious problems for subject
formation, especially since the Other’s jouissance does not vanish with foreclosure. It returns,
but unlike the return of the repressed, it returns from outside the object, “as emanating from the
real,” which is not the same as reality (Grigg 10). That which has been foreclosed does not exist
in the symbolic order, leading the psychotic subject to believe that the return of the real emanates
from his environment and not from within himself--thus the use of the term real. At the center of
human subjectivity, the ego defends and wards off overpowering or life-threatening impulses
from the unconscious by means of signification, whereby the connection between self and the
outer world remains intact. In the psychotic subject, however, the ego is not strong enough to
“establish points of attachment in the external milieu in order to exercise its defense against the
drives in the id” (Seminar III 105). The result is disintegration of the self and a sense of
disembodiment, giving rise to delusion, and ultimately, hallucinations and verbal assaults.
In dealing with psychotic patients, where what has been foreclosed finds no ways of
expression through repression, the treatment advised by Lacan is the analysis of verbal
hallucinations: “It’s the register of speech that creates all the richness of the phenomenology of
psychosis, it’s here that we see all its aspects, decompositions, refractions. Verbal hallucination,
which is fundamental to it, is precisely one of speech’s most problematic phenomenon” (Seminar
III 36). In his analysis of the function of hallucinations and verbal assaults in psychosis, Lacan
makes use of Schreber’s memoirs, Denkwürdigkeiten eines Nervenkranken. Schreber had been
read and discussed by Freud before him, and Lacan, in his reading of Schreiber, assigns the same
significance to the patient’s written statements as if he had been physically present to give an
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account of his illness. Thus, Lacan, in reading Schreiber, does not restrict himself to speech;
rather he understands verbal hallucinations as both speech and writing.
In analyzing Schreber’s writing, Lacan makes a point about the frequency of coarse
language, especially in the patient’s relationship to God. Schreber states as a matter of fact that
God is speaking to him through the rays of sunlight, and he is convinced that he can feel the
presence of souls bringing life to him. To Schreber, the presence of the souls encapsulated in the
light is more real than any of the nurses or doctors attending to him. However, his relationship to
God is ambivalent. As the guarantor of the order of the hallucinatory world that Schreber has
created for himself, God is the ultimate signifier. To write him (down), i.e., to try to capture his
essence in words, thereby turning representation into the very object it represents, could
potentially, in the words of Lacan, reduce “ this fantasmagoria . . . to a unity which doesn’t
annihilate his existence, but God’s, which is essentially language” (Seminar III 100). Fear of
annihilation, which would cause the psychotic to be lost in his hallucinatory fantasies forever, is
in turn the reason behind the coarse language in the written projections of God: “Insults are very
frequent in the divine partner’s relations with Schreber, as in an erotic relationship that one
initially refuses to take part in and resists. This is the other face, the counterpart, of the imaginary
world. The annihilating insult is a culminating point, it is one of the peaks of the speech act”
(Seminar III 100).
In the many verbal exchanges between Schreber and God “the ego-ideal has taken the
place of the Other’ – resulting in a partial delusion” (Sarah Murphy 166). In this delusional state,
Schreber is no longer speaking from the position occupied by the ego, but by the Name-of-the-
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Father. As illustrated by Lacan in his Schema L2, in exchanges between a subject and his others,
the subject never speaks from the position of Es, or S, which Murphy refers to as the “subject in
its opening up” (162). Rather, the subject sees himself speaking from the position of the ego,
which is an imaginary construct. The ego holds an essential place in the life of the subject in the
constitution of objects, including the specular other, “that ‘fellow being’ who has a very close
relation to the ego and can be superimposed on it” (Murphy 162). The specular other is an
imaginary construct and thus not the same as the Other, who is a “true” subject and as such
unattainable to the one speaking: “It is these . . . I seek to address every time I speak, but ‘the
subject is separated from the Others, the true ones, by the wall of language’” (Murphy 162).
In psychosis, the ego shifts its position as the other of the specular relationship to hold the
place of the Name-of-the-Father. Consequently, the subject speaks from two positions;
sometimes as the Father and sometimes as the subject. The use of coarse language serves to help
the subject escape annihilation through consumption by the Father. As an act that could
potentially unite or bring together subject and object, self and Other, the psychotic subject has to
evade and resist being drawn in or consumed by the Other. To uphold the distinction between
self and the imaginary Other the psychotic subject has to maintain a disbelief or rejection of that
which he does not have the means to comprehend or talk about due to the lack of the Name-ofthe-Father. Verbal hallucinations and insults serve in this sense as a form of defense mechanism,
warding off threats posed by the real.

2

Schema L allows for many possible readings; however, the main point of the schema is to illustrate that the
symbolic relation between the subject and the Other is always blocked to a certain extent by the imaginary axis
between the ego and the specular image. The discourse of the Other has to pass through the imaginary wall of
language, and in effect it reaches the subject in an interrupted and inverted form. Thus, the schema demonstrates the
opposition between the imaginary and the symbolic which is fundamental to Lacan‘s conception of psychoanalysis.
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In the same manner, but in reversed order, language as a threat imposes itself on the subject in
that it must be articulated by him. When the Other is presented as the ultimate sign or referent
with its own essence or nature in the world of the psychotic, the act of speaking or writing can
potentially put an end to the Other and thereby to language itself. Lacan addresses the
significance of withholding or “leaving the sense in suspense” noticeable in Schreber’s writing,
particularly in sentences left unfinished and interrupted in the middle, leaving the subject and the
Other in suspension: “It is at all times necessary to produce diversionary phenomena so that God
is not absorbed back into the central existence of the subject. This isn’t self-evident but well
illustrates the creator’s relationship to what he creates. The withdrawal of his function and his
essence effectively allows the corresponding nothing that is his lining to appear” (Seminar III
100-101). By means of non-articulation and a refusal on the part of the psychotic subject to
deliver the Other in words, through language, the Other’s threatening and all-encompassing
existence is nullified and exposed as nothing, as emptiness. The threat posed by the Other is
thereby not only evaded by the subject, but the subject takes control over the creation,
establishing a form or sense of ownership by means of censorship, thus annihilating, if only
temporarily, the existence of the Other.
In Agathe’s case, the threat posed by the real, which the protagonist finds no way of
integrating into the symbolic order, involves physical and erotic intimacy. The anguish
associated with sex is partly the result of a number of traumatic incidents in the life of the
protagonist but also due to the overbearing presence of her father. In Grigg’s account, to
understand the importance of the father for the onset of psychosis “one needs to consider the
father’s relation to the law in itself. This leads him [Lacan] to remark that psychosis occurs with
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‘particular frequency’ when the father ‘functions as a legislator,’ whether as one who actually
makes the laws or as one who poses as the incarnation of high ideals” (18).
As the head of the household, Agathe’s father has the final say in all decisions concerning
his daughter, and he exerts his will to such an extent that he – not the mother or Agathe - decides
what books she is allowed to read, what clothes she will wear, what people she will see and with
whom she will be seen. He sets high ideals in all that concerns his daughter, and in the father’s
eyes humility and modesty are especially womanly virtues. Eager to please her father and not
cause any turmoil or inconvenience, Agathe makes it her duty to fulfill all of his wishes.
The initial incident that may be viewed as the traumatic event that causes foreclosure of
the Name-of-the-Father, leaving the protagonist without the signifier necessary to symbolize or
talk about certain experiences, takes place at an early age. It concerns sexual reproduction and
the question “Where do babies come from?” Agathe learns from her friend and future sister-inlaw, Eugenie Wutrow, that babies are the result of sexual intercourse between man and woman.
In order to verify the information, Agathe turns to her mother, who informs her daughter that
babies are brought by God’s angels. Agathe shares these new facts with Eugenie, who responds:
“Ach, Deine Mama .. Mütter lügen einem immer was vor!” (15). Agathe is devastated at the idea
that her mother would lie to her, and with horror she listens to Eugenie’s account of human
reproduction: “Was Eugenie ihr sonst noch erzählte hatte – nein, das war ganz abscheulich. Pfui
– pfui – ganz greulich. Nein, das konnte gar nicht wahr sein. Aber – wenn es doch wahr wäre?
Und ihre Mama und ihr Papa … Sie schämte sich tot” (15). That same night, when her mother
comes to her bed to kiss her goodnight, Agathe turns away from her: “Nein – sie konnte ihre
Mama niemals – niemals wieder nach so etwas fragen” (15).

22

At the heart of the conversation between Agathe and Eugenie is an impossibility that is
constituative of the real according to Lacan: the impossibility of any sexual relationship between
man and woman. The entrance into language represents a break from any sense of materiality in
and of itself, situating the Other behind “the wall of language.” Thus the body cannot appear in
language; it can only be represented by it. This impossibility stems from the fact that the signifier
stands in for the body of the Other, making it impossible for any kind of unmediated relationship
or dialogue to take place between the subject and the Other. Or, as Ellie Ragland-Sullivan in
referencing Jacques-Alain Miller puts it, “the referent of all language, or creation itself, is the
vacuousness of language, the void” (50).
Despite the futility of language ever being the thing it represents, and thus truly capturing
or embodying the objects it refers to, language serves to create surplus value, or jouissance. The
jouissance stems from the desire associated with attempting to express or capture the
unspeakable, i.e., that which is at the very heart of the void of language. Ragland-Sullivan refers
to the emptiness around which language is structured as “the impossible kernel that cannot be
spoken, but which, nonetheless, evokes desire around which fantasies are elaborated” (48). In
Lacanian terminology, “the impossible kernel that cannot be spoken” is object a.
In Televison, Lacan offers the following definition of object a: “The object petit a is what
falls from the subject in anxiety. It is precisely the same object that I delineated as the cause of
desire” (82). He lists a number of forms that the object petit a may assume: the oral object, the
anal object, the specular image - i (a) -, and the voice. As the fallen object of the Other, object
petit a represents separation, and its function in fantasy is to fill in or compensate for the void
caused by loss: “There [in fantasy] it [object petit a] takes on its influence as support of desire, in
so far as desire is the most intense of what the subject can attain in his realization as subject at
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the level of consciousness. It is by way of that chain that, once again, the dependencies of desire
in relation to the desire of the Other are affirmed” (82-83).
Lacan cautions his listeners not to confuse the Other with the subject “who speaks from
the place of the Other, even if through its voice” (88). What comes before the Other, and

ultimately before desire, is the mythical father understood as an animal. He preceeds the law
and its prohibition, kinship and marriage. He is the leader of a hoard, whose satisfaction
“knows no bounds” (88). Acccording to Lacan, this primordial father’s desire is the
structuring principle of the subject’s desire, and ultimately language, but not in terms of
“erotic bliss” demanding satisfaction but as a signifier standing in for his desire: “in a strictly
literal interpretation of the letter” (89). The gap between God’s erotic bliss and its fulfillment
is ultimately the objet petit a, or the thing fallen from the Other.
Slavoj Žižek refers to the objet petit a as the sublime object: “the impassive, imaginary
objectification of the real” (185). As formulated by Žižek, the sublime object is situated at the
intersection between the real and the imaginary, and it carries certain meanings invested in it by
the subject. Take as an example a breast, which is a body part and as such a part of the real, but
also an imaginary construct associated with nurturing, feeding, care, sex etc. Further, it is an
object of desire that is represented or signified in and through language, and in effect, always
unattainable. The unattainability of the object serves to draw the subject in, and it creates a
surplus of pleasure, or jouissance. This pleasure is both negative and positive in nature, thereby
adding suffering to pleasure, and pain to joy. Why that is the case is discussed in more detail in
chapter 2. For our discussion on the impossibility of sexual relations betweem man and woman
according to Lacan, it suffices to know that as a result of its position between the real and the
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imaginary, the sublime object is situated on the threshold of language, close to the very center of
the void.
At the center of the void is that which cannot be truly captured or represented by
language. In their exchange concerning human reproduction, Agathe and Eugenie move to the
very heart of this complexity according to Lacan. Unlike Eugenie, who shows a fascination for
the topic of sex and a desire to talk about it, Agathe rejects the story told by her friend. She
refuses to accept the fact that children are born as the result of sexual relations between man and
woman. The mere thought of it upsets Agathe to such an extent that she cannot bring herself to
talk about these matters with her mother. Consequently, sexual intimacy remains a contradiction
and mystery to Agathe.
At this point in her young life, the role played by the actual father in matters concerned
with sexual reproduction is beyond Agathe's comprehension. However, even though a child,
Agathe recognizes that as the upholder of the law and its prohibition, the father is in a position of
power and influence over the mother. Thus, any desire or jouissance originating from the Other
must be regulated by him. As a result of her disbelief in the disclosure offered by Eugenie
concerning sexual reproduction, Agathe remains disapproving in any matters concerned with
physical and erotic intimacy. She simply refuses to accept the fact that eroticisim is a part of
gender relations. Eventually, Agathe’s deep-seated disbelief that often turns into disgust at the
mere thought of physical contact, causes foreclosure on the part of the protagonist. In Lacanian
terms, what follows upon the exchange between Eugenie and Agathe is a rejection of the
fundamental signifier – the Name-of-the-Father – that regulates jouissance and attaches the
phallic image to the symbolic father. As an effect of foreclosure the main protagonist manages to
maintain her disregard for any matters involving physical intimacy and thus to keep threats posed
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by the real at a distance. Consequently, she fails to incorporate the body, and ultimately the real,
into the symbolic order, and the older she grows, the more difficult Agathe finds it to talk about
or express any thoughts, ideas, or desires concerned with erotic matters.
In regard to gender relations, the sexual double standard of Wilhelminian Germany is
perceived by the protagonist as especially incomprehensible and abhorrent, and thus she rejects
it. In a society, in which more sexual freedom is given to men than to women, marriage serves to
maintain this double standard. The sexual double standard represents chastity as a specifically
female virtue, reserving explorations of female sexuality to the confinements of the home and in
the service of childbirth. In her search for a suitable husband, Agathe is not merely concerned
with finding a match appropriate to her social standing, but mutual love and respect as well. Due
to her more idealistic understanding of marriage, she finds it difficult to reconcile with a view of
marital relations as a mere business transaction concerned with maintining the status quoe of
certain privileged classes and groups of people.
Eventually, the sexual double standard and her inability to comprehend the Other’s
jouissance, cause Agathe to withdraw into an imaginary world of sublimation. Although
sublimation in itself does not pose a threat to subject formation, in Agathe’s case the double
threat of sublimation in combination with foreclosure causes regression, encapsulating her in an
imaginary world of her own making. Eventually, due to her weakly developed ego, the idea of
physical intimacy elicits so much fear in Agathe that she is unable to overcome herself and
establish any references in the actual, physical world.
The fear resulting from the inability to understand the Other’s jouissance, and ultimately
appear as the object of someone else’s libido, is not only the consequence of foreclosure. A
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review of the protagonist’s childhood and young adulthood reveals a number of incidents in
which male sexuality is represented as aggressive and oppressive of women. One such incident
occurs when Agathe witnesses her brother Walter’s treatment of a servant named Wiesing.
Wiesing is sexually molested by Walter. She approaches Agathe for help. Agathe is outraged,
but concerned to keep her parents from finding out, she orders new bolts for the maid’s door in
order to keep her brother out. When installing the bolts Agathe catches a glimpse of the servant’s
room:
Wiesing hatte das Fenster in dem engen Raum seit dem Morgen noch nicht geöffnet, es
war eine abscheuliche dumpfe Luft darin. Schmutziges Wasser stand in der Schüssel,
ausgekämmtes Haar und allerlei armseliger Plunder lag auf dem Boden herum. Und
Walter – ihr peinlich sauberer, eleganter Bruder, in seiner glänzenden Uniform war hier
gewesen . . . wie war es nur möglich? Es schüttelte sie ein Grauen, ein Ekel. (52)
Agathe finds the atmosphere of the servant’s room with its bad smell, filth, and disorder
disgusting, and she cannot envisage physical contact of any kind taking place in a room of this
kind. Especially the notion of filth seems to upset the protagonist. To think that her brother, an
orderly member of the bourgeoisie, would consort with a woman of a lower class -- and thereby
use force and violence -- represents a breach of conduct so abhorrent that it sickens the
protagonist. Through his contact with the maid and due to the nature of their interaction, in
Agathe’s eyes the brother now appears contaminated by the maid and the filth symbolized by her
disorderly room. Agathe confronts the brother and is further appalled and discouraged by his
reactions. The brother, who exhibits nothing but anger and resentment, orders his sister to stay
out of his business. When she challenges him on the matter of his impending marriage and the
“ehrlos” nature of his behavior, Walter threatens to strike Agathe (53). She bursts into tears, and
the discussion is thereby curtailed. Traumatized by the incident, Agathe distances herself from

27

the female servant from this day on: “Es war für sie etwas Gemeines an dem Mädchen haften
geblieben” (53).
After the confrontation with Walter, Agathe does not bring up the incident again. The
issue is, however, not resolved for the protagonist by avoiding the topic. The revelation of the
incident in the maid’s room causes estrangement between brother and sister: “Auch wenn sie
Wiesing ansah, empfand sie eine heftige Abneigung gegen das Mädchen, durch welches sie ihren
Bruder verloren hatte” (52). Interesting in the protagonist’s reaction in the moment of disclosure
is her need to protect her brother by projecting all of her aversion and repulsion onto Wiesing.
One could read Agathe’s attitude as a defense mechanism. As a family member, Agathe interacts
with Walter regularly and consequently she has to find strategies in order to socialize with the
brother.
In order to maintain the relationship between the parents’ household, of which she is a
part, and Walter and his family, the protagonist takes it upon herself to keep her parents from
finding out. In order to hide a secret of this magnitude, Agathe retreats to the imaginary. By
turning the maid into an abject object associated with filth and pollution, she avoids the threat
posed by Wiesing. Hence, Wiesing bcomes the Other in negative terms. Not only does Agathe
fail to identify with her; the maid also represents the real in that she embodies all that Agathe
finds repulsive about physical intimacy.
Attempting to restore order by integrating the incident into the symbolic order, the
protagonist turns to her brother. As a man and family father, he inhabits the position of the
symbolic father, and thus of social order. To Agathe’s amazement, however, Walter’s reaction
does not reflect her understanding of socially accepted behavior. Further, he shuts down the
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conversation in a manner so violent that the protagonist is forced to repress the incident. In
effect, there is a break of communication, forcing the fearful event out of the realm of the
symbolic, thereby rendering it incomprehensible and without meaning. The efforts to forget
about the sexual assault are further supported by the mother’s decision to fire Wiesing as a
consequence of her becoming pregnant with another man’s baby. Agathe is relieved. Now the
threat posed by Wiesing as a symbolic return of the real is eradicated and order -- represented by
the symbolic father as a guarantor of stability and orderly conduct -- is restored.
It is not until several years later that Agathe reconsiders the implications of Walter’s
treatment of Wiesing. An old woman comes to the house with a letter addressed to Agathe. It is
from Wiesing. She has recently lost her baby and due to complications related to labor she is
dying. In the letter Wiesing asks Agathe to provide her with the money to pay for the baby’s
coffin. Agathe rushes to aid the dying woman, but unable to save the former maid she is devasted
by the other’s death: “Und sie und ihre Mutter waren schuldig. Ja – ja – ja – sie waren schuldig”
(142).
Upon returning to the house, Agathe informs the mother of Wiesing’s death. The old
woman reacts in a cold and distanced manner: “Ja – diese Frauenzimmer – sie taugen alle nichts
– sie sind zu unserer Qual erschaffen” (142). Agathe cannot understand how her mother, who is
otherwise such a compassionate woman, can be so cold. Puzzled by her mother’s reaction,
Agathe remembers a comment once uttered by her cousin: “Ein hartes Urteil fiel ihr ein, das
Martin Greffinger einmal über die Frauen der Bourgeoisie gefällt hatte – über ihre verknöcherte
Engherzigkeit. Aber der war doch Sozialdemokrat oder irgend so etwas Ähnliches. Er durfte
nicht Recht behalten! Er durfte nicht!” (143). Agathe is unwilling to consider the plausibility of
class difference as the reason behind the old woman’s dismissal of Wiesing’s misfortunes.
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Instead, she dismisses Martin’s opinion as the result of political confusion. As a social democrat,
he has left his social milieu and upbringing behind; an act that at this point in the story is
unimaginable to Agathe.
The protagonist’s inability to confront her mother is an indication of, in my reading, the
lack of emotional attachment between mother and daughter, caused by their separation at a point
of sexual awakening in Agathe’s childhood. A woman who has borne many children, the
majority of which died as infants, the mother is weakened by sorrow. Overwhelmed by her
responsibility for her daughter’s education in domestic duties, she decides to send Agathe to a
boarding school as a young woman. The mother sets for herself ideals of femininity modeled on
notions of “Bescheidenheit,” which Agathe’s father very much favors, and she finds the burning
intensity of her young daughter to be an assault on her very being, causing her nerves to suffer
(19). When she asked her acquaintances for advice, they all recommended that she send Agathe
to “die Pension”: “Überall riet man ihr ‘die Pension’. Sie sah also, daß das Übel, welches sie
quälte, ein weitverbreitetes war, und das beruhigte sie vollständig” (19).
As a consequence of her decision to charge others with the responsibility for her
daughter’s education, the mother has little or no influence on what happens at the boarding
school. With formal classroom training only constituting one part of Agathe’s socialization, the
other young women at the boarding school serve as a major source of support and personal
growth in all matters concerned with the life of a bourgeois woman. Old friendships are renewed
again, and new ones forged, but none is as influential for Agathe as her reconnection with her
former childhood friend, Eugenie Wutrow.
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Eugenie is sexually precocious, and she has been sent to the boarding school by her parents after
an incident with one of her father’s employees. Agathe, who is attracted yet intimidated by the
“sexual” nature of her friend, shares moments of physical and emotional intimacy with Eugenie.
In one of these moments, Eugenie confides in Agathe about the reason behind her residence at
the boarding school, and overcome by passion she kisses Agathe.That same night Agathe awakes
from her sleep suffused with an intense and sudden feeling of desire: “Plötzlich, nach kurzer
Zeit, kam sie wieder zur Besinnung, geweckt von einem großen brennenden Sehnsuchtsgefühl,
welches ihr ganz fremd, ganz neu und schreckenerregend und doch entzückend wonnig war, so
daß sie sich ihm einen Augenblick völlig hingab” (23). In this instance Agathe utters the name
“Mani”, her cousin, with whom she had been spent a few weeks in the summer at the home of
mutual relatives (23). Agathe is overwhelmed and confused by her feelings, and she immediately
folds her hands in prayer in order to forget all about the incident.
During her stay at the boarding school, Agathe develops an attachment to Eugenie with
clear homoerotic tendencies. But, rather than constituting the object of Agathe’s desire, Eugenie
may also function as a stand-in or substitute for what is missing in the symbolic order, in which
case the homoerotic desire experienced by Agathe may be read as a precursor of psychosis.
Lacan, as explained by Russell Grigg in A Compendium of Lacanian Terms, uses the analogy of
a three-legged stool to clarify the function of a stand-in, or substitute, in psychosis. With the help
of the stand-in, the psychotic subject avoids having to confront the lack constitutive of the
missing signifier, in Lacan’s analogy represented by the missing leg. Rather, the subject remains
stable until the day of the return of the real, which marks the onset of psychosis. In effect, the
psychotic subject can go undiagnosed for a long time; in some cases an entire lifetime. Schreber,
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for instance, held a position as a judge for many years, until the outbreak of psychosis in his
early fifties.
By transferring her desire onto Eugenie, Agathe avoids having to confront the absence of
the Name-of-the-Father. It allows her to remain dismissive of sharing any thoughts or desires
concerned with romantic and/or sexual desire with the other girls. Soon Agathe is accused by her
fellow boarding school friends of being a prude who sticks her nose in the air as soon as the
subject of sex comes up, and she is kept from reading the books that the girls circulate among
themselves. Sent by a family member to one of the girls, these books are of kind considered by
most adults inappropriate for young women to read. Agathe, who suspects they deal with notions
of romance, is both happy and disappointed not to be part of the other girls’ discussions.
Bourgeoning sexuality and Christian morals were not explicitly addressed as conflicting
with each other in the education of young women from better families. Agathe, however,
recognizes that her belief in the one and only love, supported by her Christian background,
prevents her from sharing the other girls’ excitement over sexual and romantic explorations.
Even though encouraged by Dr. Engelbert, instructor of religious studies at the boarding school,
to consider the possibility of Jesus as a man of flesh and blood and the legitimate son of Mary
and Joseph, Agathe cannot and will not give up her faith in the divine nature of Jesus. By staying
a virgin both in body and spirit and thereby honoring her faith in the Christian Trinity, she hopes
to remain worthy of the love of her future husband: “Sie wollte auch immer streng und abwesend
bleiben – bis – ja bis Er kommen würde, der Herrlichste von allen! Visionen weißer
Schleierwolken und brennender Altarkerzen schwebten durch ihre Phantasie” (28).
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Notice here the reference to the one and only love as “Er” spelled with upper case “e.” It is in
fact not unusual to capitalize the first letter of the third person singular when referring to an
unknown, imaginary man who is the object of romantic ideals and desires, yet if we replace “Er”
with “Gott,” the significance of Agathe’s statement changes drastically.
Given the reference Agathe makes in the opening scene of the novel, in which she
compares God to a father figure as well as a divine bridegroom, one could assume that Agathe
envisions marriage a relationship based on devotion as well as obedience according to strict rules
formulated by the husband. In this sense, Agathe does not seem to differ significantly from the
other young women at the boarding school. Yet, while the significance of purity and virginity in
spiritual as well as erotic matters concerning women’s sexuality does not prevent some young
women from exploring, or at least fantasizing about, the implications of their awakening
romantic and sexual desires, Agathe remains disapproving. She makes repeated attempts
throughout her stay at the boarding school, and later when introduced to men, to sublimate the
notion of sexual desire. Unable to overcome her fear of physical intimacy, she retreats to an
imaginary world inhabited first by the poet Lord Byron and later by an artist named Herr von
Lutz.
In Lord Byron Agathe identifies an object of her desire. While at an art exhibit with her
father, Agathe stops in front of a painting of the famous poet. Mesmerized by his beauty, Agathe
returns to the exhibition again the following day to catch a glimpse of the poet: “Das Mädchen
schlich zu ihm, wie zu einem verbotenen Genuß, sie berauschte sich an der Sehnsucht, die nun
ein Ziel gefunden hatte, bei dem sie doch immer Sehnsucht bleiben konnte” (46). Telling in
Agathe’s fascination with Lord Byron with respect to her problematic relationship to sexual
intimacy is that her desire is described in terms of “forbidden pleasure” that remains imaginary.
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When faced with an object upon which she can project her desire safely, Agathe retreats into a
world of fantasies and imagination in which “die natürliche Beziehung der Geschlechter zu
einander erschien in einer wilden Gewitterstimmung, durch die ihr dann doch alles wieder den
Eindruck eines phantastischen Märchens machte” (46).
Initially, as a young woman, Agathe finds support for her romantic and sexual desire in
fantasy by means of sublimation. In order to make sexual intercourse less threatening, Agathe
creates an imaginary Other, out of reach. The more intense her desire and passion for Lord Byron
grows, the more she distances herself from the people and events around her, showing nothing
but vague interest in what is going on in the world outside her imagination. In her infatuation
with her imaginary lover, her feelings remain of a platonic nature, that is, her attachment is of
such kind that it excludes the idea of physical intimacy. In Agathe’s imagination, the sublimation
of sexual desire into romantic notions of renunciation functions as a form of atonement, and it
serves to impassion and animate the beloved one: “Durch unerhörte Entsagung entsühnte sie den
Geliebten – und der weinte zu ihren Füßen und seine Augen waren wie lodernde Flammen……”
(47).
Unlike men such as her brother, Lord Byron, as imagined by Agathe, is in control of his
desire. To pay respect to the sacrifice made by Agathe, he restrains his passions so as not to
violate the terms of decency and honor so important to bourgeois notions of female sexuality.
More importantly, Lord Byron is a man who appreciates and honors the female subject as an
individual in her own right. By not forcing himself upon her (as did her brother with the maid),
he shows not only restraint but also respect for the will of the other. Ultimately, foregoing sex
seems to stir up greater passion in Agathe’s imaginary lover, whereby physical intimacy as an act
imagined and controlled by the protagonist is eluded, yet permitted.
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Hence, Agathe experiences a sort of pleasure in abstinence that stems from controlling while
charging the object of her desire with all of her want and longing. However, the portrayal of
Lord Byron as a man of honor and passion is the result of his status as a figment of Agathe’s
imagination. We recall that Agathe encounters him as a painting hanging in the museum. In other
words, he is a dead subject that cannot look back at Agathe, thus allowing her to gaze and roam
freely in her imagination.
How then is the notion of love as imaginary related to language and the Name-of-theFather? As mentioned before, Agathe’s behavior is characterized by conformity. When told on
the day of her Communion that the book she receives from her cousin Martin needs to be
exchanged for another book, Agathe submits to the will of her father. A few years later, finding
her way into her father’s library and there discovering books that her father disapproves of her
reading, Agathe quietly resigns herself to being kept from the books she desires. And when
informed that her dowry is gone, and the first – and the last – of her suitors – a man named
Raikendorf – leaves, Agathe crumbles inside, but still there is no rebellion on her part. In all that
happens to her she remains sensible and pleasing in her resolve to remain self-sacrificing and
obedient and thus to fulfill the ideal imposed upon her at her Confirmation.
But, in order to deal with the expectations of her social milieu, Agathe retreats into an
imaginary world of her own creation. Again, I want to emphasize that this imaginary world is not
initially a delusional one, but offers the female protagonist respite and comfort. And it is in this
context that imagination as a creative act grants the protagonist a certain level of agency. While
some readers may not consider her imaginings enough of a break with the expectations set by her
family, the power or will to be her own person is nevertheless a driving force in Agathe’s efforts
to formulate ideas and visions of her liking. Unfortunately, for the female character, her
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imaginative powers are not supported by an equal transition or translation into symbolic power.
Without a language to express her ideas and desires and with no financial means to support
herself, she remains dependent on her family, and ultimately her father. More importantly,
however, the respite offered by the imaginary vanishes.
After Agathe’s family fails to provide the necessary dowry for her to marry Raikendorf,
Agathe is given the responsibility of caring for her sick mother. When the old woman dies, the
protagonist officially takes over the household duties she had performed during her mother’s
illness. Fatigued and on the verge of nervous exhaustion, Agathe accompanies her father on a
trip to Switzerland, where she meets Martin again. In the subsequent encounter between her and
Martin, the relationship between foreclosure, language, and psychosis is made explicit.
During their stay in Switzerland, Martin and Agathe are engaged in many long
discussions about the future. Martin encourages Agathe to move to Zürich, where she could get
her own room and a suitable occupation, working either for Martin or, if she would rather, for
another employer. No obligations, bonds, or attachments; just Agathe leading her own life,
supported in spirit by Martin. Agathe realizes that the fears she previously harbored regarding
her cousin were unjustified. In Martin, once a rebellious and passionate soul with non-bourgeois
ideas of freedom and justice, she now sees a man of conviction and success:
Nur ein freier Mensch war er geworden. Weiter nichts. Und was das heißen wollte – ein
freier Mensch. Welche Kluft zwischen einer ganz auf sich gestellten Persönlichkeit, die
nach eigenem Gesetz und eigener Wahl das eigene Leben führt, und den Kreisen ihrer
Gesellschaft! An solchem Maß gemessen – besaß jede That, jeder Gedanke ihres Daseins
überhaupt noch Wert? Das ahnte sie nun erst. Es war ein schauderndes Aufwachen mit
ungeduldigem Flügelschlagen ihrer Seele. (168)
Despite her desire to break free and live life according to her own liking, the suggestion to
abandon her father horrifies Agathe. She looks in vain for emotional support from Martin, who
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remains unresponsive and detached. Terrified people will consider her a “fallen woman” if she
follows her desire, a part of her still wishes Martin would show some level or degree of
tenderness, not excluding the possibility of a future marital arrangement more in accordance with
the expectations of the bourgeoisie. A few days later, however, the crushing of her secret wish
causes Agathe to suffer a nervous breakdown. The incident leading up to the onset of psychosis
centers on Agathe’s deep-seated fear of physical intimacy.
Martin is flirting with a young waitress. Minutes before another male customer had flirted
with the same waitress, and Agathe had found his actions repugnant. Now she sees the same
behavior in the man she respects so highly: “Die halbgeschlossenen, blinzelnden Lider, aus
denen ein grünliches Licht nach dem Mädchen drüben züngelte. . . . Das Lächeln um die Lippen
– sie sprachen kein Wort – sie lockten und baten doch . . . .” (175). Without uttering a word, she
stands up and walks away.
Later that night, Martin takes Agathe for a walk to discuss the incident. He makes it clear
to her what the nature of their friendship is and that in the future he will not accept any jealousy
or childish behavior on her part: “Für so klein und sentimental und weiblich eitel, wie sie sich
heut gezeigt, habe er sie nicht gehalten. Er wollte sie für die Freiheit gewinnen. Aber er werde
sich nicht unter die Tyrannei eines prüden und thörichten Frauenzimmers beugen” (178). He asks
for an explanation and the first words that come to Agathe’s mind are “Weil ich Dich liebe!”
schrie sie ihn gellend an. Sie wußte ihm in dem Augenblick keine größere Beleidigung
entgegenzuschleudern” (179). Agathe exhibits the first sign of psychosis immediately thereafter.
Running off in tears, she gets lost temporarily, when all of a sudden she hears loud laughter. It
takes her some time to realize that the laugher stems from her, and shocked to hear such sounds
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coming out of her mouth, Agathe summons her remaining strength and walks back to the hotel,
where she locks herself in her room.
As Grigg points out in Lacan, Language, and Philosophy, Lacan argues that the onset of
psychosis is triggered by a certain kind of encounter, in which “the Name-of-the-Father is
‘summoned to that place [the Other] in symbolic opposition to the subject’” (14). The symbolic
opposition is the result of what Lacan calls “‘l’appel,’ ‘the call,’ ‘the calling,’ ‘the appeal,’ or
even ‘the interpellation’ (Grigg 14). Interpellation occurs in situations in which one subject calls
upon another subject to make a decision in order to pursue a certain course of action. The one
calling thereby acts in the-Name-of-the-Father, i.e., as someone who demands action and
symbolic recognition, and ultimately to be acknowledged as the representative of the law and its
prohibition.
Agathe is called upon by Martin. As she watches him flirt with the young waitress,
Martin shares his desire for the other woman with his cousin: “Reizendes Mädel – findest Du
nicht?” (176). By uttering these words, Martin lays down the law that is to govern the
relationship between him and Agathe. Further, he asks for recognition and for her to follow his
lead, that is, to set herself above her bourgeois sentiments regarding gender relations. Due to
foreclosure that took place at an early stage in her life, when she was still a child, Agathe cannot
comprehend or make sense of the Other’s jouissance, here expressed by Martin’s flirtation with
the waitress. When called upon by her cousin she is confronted with the absence of the Name-ofthe-Father, and thereby the return of the real.
Against Agathe’s will, her father asks Eugenie to assist him in the care of his daughter.
Following the doctor’s order, Eugenie and Agathe are sent on a six-week long stay at a
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sanatorium. Without money and too weak to make her voice heard, Agathe finds herself confined
in a place inhabited by numerous neurotic women, a doctor she despises, and a sister-in-law she
cannot stand. Before the psychosis takes its full toll on her, Agathe once again wishes she could
escape and go to Zürich. Realizing, however, how utterly hopeless her situation is, she succumbs
to her despair. Sleep deprived due to the relentless activity of her mind, Agathe can no longer
muster the strength to contain the inner turmoil.
One afternoon as Eugenie walks in after an excursion in the countryside, Agathe attacks
her sister-in-law and tries to strangle her. What follows is a series of verbal hallucinations or
insults. What exactly she says in this hallucinatory, delirious moment is not stated, but the text
hints that the confessions made by the psychotic Agathe are of an explicitly sexual nature: “die
arme Agathe beschuldigte sich, Dinge getan zu haben – vor dem Doktor und den
Krankenwärterinnen – es war ja ganz unsinnig – kein Wort davon wahr! Sie hatte ja nicht die
kleinste Backfischliebschaft gehabt . . . . Und sie nannte sich mit Namen – brauchte Ausdrücke,
als ob ein böser Geist aus ihr redete” (188).
The insult so characteristic of verbal hallucinations is the climax of the interaction
between the psychotic subject and the Other. By insulting the imaginary Other, who is always a
creation of the psychotic subject and thus lacks a stable referent in the actual world, the
psychotic subject tries to make sense of the incomprehensible, i.e., the Other’s jouissance.
Wanting or desiring to become a part of the Other, that is, to be one with the Other, yet dreading
the consequences that consummation has on identity, the psychotic subject oscillates between
using language to call forth and to annihilate the Other. In other words, the Other is not only
represented by the language used by the psychotic subject to summon and/or annul his existence
in imaginary terms, but the Other becomes the very language itself. Beyond the speech act, of
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which verbal hallucinations and insults are the culmination, there exists nothing or nobody in the
world of the psychotic. Thus, language is employed by the psychotic in order both to command
and control, to create and destroy.
Why then does Agathe try to strangle Eugenie? And what is the importance of the verbal
hallucinations uttered by Agathe? As mentioned before, in the childhood and adolescence of the
protagonist, Eugenie has a significant impact on the more innocent Agathe in matters concerned
with sex and romance. Agathe identifies in her friend her opposite in terms of sexual liberation
and exploration, and she is fascinated by the implications of sexual intimacy embodied and
expressed by Eugenie. She is also terrified, for reasons having to do with the foreclosure of the
Name-of-the-Father.
When introduced to the scene of socially accepted forms of contact between young men
and women, Agathe fails to establish meaningful connections or bond with people of the
opposite sex. Eugenie, on the other hand, is successful in the game or play of young bourgeois
women in the search for a suitable husband. She is able to choose from a number of suitors and
eventually she settles for Agathe’s brother. An attractive and flirtatious woman also after
marrying, Eugenie not only bears several children but also remains the center of male attention at
parties and other social gatherings.
Agathe, depicted as a young, attractive woman who lacks the confidence and selfassurance of her sister-in-law, grows increasingly disillusioned in her search for a man to love
and respect. Seeing how Eugenie continues to use her impressive physical appearance and beauty
even after being married to exert control and power over men, Agathe becomes rigid and
dismissive in her interactions with members of the opposite sex. At the same time, she continues
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to harbor dreams of finding love and somebody who will treat her as an equal. With Martin
leaving, and herself going to the sanatorium, her dreams are forever crushed.
In Lacanian terms, the subject position occupied by Eugenie at the end of the novel is the
one of the specular other in the psychotic’s imaginary world. As the subject passes the mirror
stage, s/he learns to identify with his/her own image, and thus to view his/her own body as it is
perceived from another point of view, a process that is necessary for socialization. This
relationship to the specular other is characterized by an imaginary relationship based on erotic
attachment as well as aggressive rivalry. The erotic attachment stems from identification with the
specular other, and the aggression from the fact that both subject and (other) object fight for
recognition from the Other, ultimately, the pre-oedipal mother/father. In cases of psychosis, the
subject is locked into this relationship to the (specular) other, leading to narcissism and failure to
identify with other subjects. Instead, the other becomes an erotic object as well as the agent of
persecution.
Agathe is attracted to Eugenie. Simultaneously, she experiences a sense of rivalry and
aggression towards her sister-in-law. Agathe both wants and does not want what her sister-inlaw has. Torn between the pressure to conform and the desire to break free from convention,
Agathe fails to transition from a position of dependence and submission vis-à-vis her sister-inlaw. Without the support from the Name-of-the-Father, she cannot make sense of the Other’s
jouissance -- in the last scene embodied by Martin, -- and Eugenie functions both as a stand-in,
or substitute, for the lack of the signifier, as well as the rival for the Other’s desire.
Numb and without ambition or desire to escape the confines of convention, not even in
imaginary terms, at the end of the novel Agathe leads a quiet life next to her father. “So leben sie
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still nebeneinander her – voller Rücksichten und innerlich sich fremd” (188). The irony of the
statement is impossible to miss. Here, Reuter employs the hyphen as a strategic stylistic element
to state the obvious without naming it. On either side of it – the hyphen – father and daughter are
situated, separated in time and space by their differences. He – a man, a father, of old age and
(once high) social power – and she – a (unmarried) woman, a dependent without any social
and/or symbolic influence. There is nothing in their relationship that suggests equality or mutual
understanding or respect; yet father and daughter are civil to each other.
Residing peacefully with her father, Agathe -- a woman not yet forty -- has no concerns
or worries regarding the future. She lives one day at a time, her health being her main concern.
Another distraction to her liking is the collection of crochet patterns:
Agathes Gedächtnis hat gelitten – in ihrer Vergangenheit sind Abschnitte, auf welche sie
sich nicht mehr besinnen kann. Einem längeren Gespräch zu folgen, ist ihr nicht mehr
möglich. Sie hat sich eine Sammlung von Häkelmustern angelegt, und freut sich, wenn
sie ein neues hinzufügen kann. Die Zukunft macht ihr keine Sorge mehr. Sie begreift
auch nicht, daß so vieles sie früher aufregen konnte – jetzt läßt alles, was nicht ihre
Gesundheit betrifft, sie ganz gleichgültig. Sie seufzt oft und ist traurig – zumal wenn die
Sonne hell scheint und die Blumen blühen, wenn sie Musik hört oder Kinder spielen
sieht. Aber sie wüßte kaum noch zu sagen, warum … (188)
“Warum . . . .” Once again Reuter makes use of irony in implying but not naming or writing out
the obvious. Why, one may think, would Agathe ever have any reason to be unhappy or sad?
With nothing to worry about but herself, and possibly, as stated by the author in the very last
sentence of the novel, a long life ahead of her, Agathe is free. With no more obligations, or
duties, or concerns regarding convention and/or appropriate behavior, the female protagonist is
finally her own person. Yet, as implied by the ellipsis Agathe is still, at times, sad. Why is that?
To answer the question we need to return to the importance ascribed by Lacan to the
Name-of-the-Father and the implications of foreclosure for psychosis. As pointed out by Lacan,
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language constitutes both a threat and a defense mechanism in the psychotic’s imaginary world.
The subject re-appropriates language as a metaphor or tool to bridge or piece together the
fragments of the psychotic subject, and thereby close off the threats posed by the real. In effect,
s/he becomes a creator of his/her own making. The power or significance of language in the
psychotic’s world follows as an effect of leaving meaning in suspension by piecing together
words and sentences in an unconventional fashion, or, as in Schreber’s case, by leaving
sentences unfinished, and open-ended. As a consequence hereof, meaning beyond meaning is
created, whereby the very text itself becomes the imaginary universe constituting the fragmented
subject. S/he is his/her own creation, understood in relation to the Other, who evokes both fear
and attraction in the psychotic subject.
As an attempt in order to break free from or open up this universe or text of identitymaking in disguise, the psychotic subject has to find a way to integrate the traumatic experience
into the symbolic order, as suggested by Agathe’s interest in crochet patterns. The arbitrary
relationship between signifier, signified and referent that comprises the sign according to
Saussure allows Agathe to re-appropriate the notion of pattern making as a form of signification
to establish order in a disorganized or fragmented symbolic system. One could argue that
Agathe’s interest in collecting and stacking crochet patterns is an expression of a psychotic state
of mind and a desire on the part of the protagonist to employ the symbolic representation enabled
by patterns as a form of language.
By establishing a system of signification with importance solely to the imaginative
workings of the protagonist, and thus preventing interaction and/or communication with the
world of common sense, pattern making beyond the obvious serves to ward off and protect the
protagonist from the threats posed by the real. In effect, the separation between the real and the
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symbolic essential for structuring and maintaining the psychotic’s world or imaginary creation
remains intact. Agathe thus appears as a creator of a mindless space and time that is beyond
meaning, and therefore exclusively her own. Closed off from the world of symbolic signification,
she is safe from any threat posed by failure to conform as well as (aggressive) physical intimacy.
Another plausible explanation for Agathe’s fascination with crochet patterns emerges if
one considers the importance of language, and signification to overcoming the fragmentation of
self, characteristic of psychotic subjects. By creating a collection, and adding one pattern to
another in an orderly fashion, the subject without a clear sense of self composes a language or
system of signification that allows for re-integration. Viewed as a first step or attempt on the part
of the protagonist to piece herself together, the notion of collecting crochet patterns may be
understood as an act of willing, and becoming. Not yet forty and possibly with a long life ahead
of her, Agathe may yet succeed in overcoming her fear of the real, and thus reappear in life as a
woman with a voice of her own.
In concluding this chapter on Agathe, I would like to mention a few things about Reuter’s
writing style as it relates to matters of psychosis and language entrapment discussed in Aus Guter
Familie. Through the repeated use of stylistic elements such as the hyphen and ellipsis, Reuter
explicitly reflects on Agathe’s disposition in regard to the symbolic order, thereby creating an
excess of meaning. By no means do I wish to suggest that Reuter’s writing is psychotic or
beyond meaning, but that she employs certain stylistic elements, mainly the hyphen and elipses,
to avoid symbolization of the unspoken traumas and sufferings of her female protagonist. One
could read this both as an invitation to the reader to make her own assumptions regarding the
nature of the unstated, as well as a strategy on the part of the author to avoid naming the
unnamable in symbolic terms.
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My assumption of the nature of Agathe’s disposition in relation to the symbolic would support
the latter. As a stylistic element, the void opened up by the repeated use of the hyphen and
ellipsis reflects in linguistic terms the inability of the protagonist to enter into discourse and
formulate in her own words the desire to be her own person. Metaphorically speaking, Agathe is
the subject who cannot be one because she lacks her own language. By leaving meaning in
suspension by means of, for instance, the hyphen, the text expresses the state of mind of the
protagonist in a powerful manner. Hence, the significance of Agathe’s destiny lies not in her
success but her failure.
Given the protagonist’s inability to transition or change discourse from the imaginary to
the symbolic due to the real threats posed by the sexual double standard, her story offers a
critical perspective on a period of history in which men are depicted and understood as
incarnations of the law, and in some cases even of God, whereas women are seen as their
inferiors. In addition, the significance of language to social power is made explicit by a
protagonist who, despite numerous attempts, fails to enter into discourse. Bereft of language, and
thus a position within society, Agathe lacks agency in any real and/or symbolic terms.

45

Chapter 3: On the Apparently Negative and
the Life-Affirming Principal of the
Übermensch
In chapter one I offer a reading of Aus guter Familie according to which the female protagonist
Agathe is granted some level of agency in relation to her appropriation of crochet patterns as a
strategy to structure and overcome the fragmentation of self resulting from psychosis, and
ultimately electric shock treatment. However, as noted, this agency does not extend beyond the
imaginary, and in effect Agathe remains enclosed in a symbolic realm of her own making that
lacks referents in the world of common sense. Thus, the main protagonist of Reuter’s best-selling
novel does not emancipate herself from the influence exercised by the father to enter into
discourse. Throughout the novel, her being depends on male symbolic power and authorization,
and the efforts to establish an identity that could potentially conflict with or question the
paradigm of her father and, ultimately, bourgeois society are never realized or acted upon.
In the other two novels by Reuter still to be discussed in this thesis – Ellen von der
Weiden and Das Tränenhaus – the female protagonists are more successful in the internalization
of the Name-of-the-Father, this success granting them some level of agency as subjects in their
own right. Initially unable to reconcile themselves with their respective fates as unmarried
pregnant women, eventually both Ellen and Cornelie find strategies for overcoming some of the
restrictions caused by rigid gender norms. In this chapter I explore notions of unwanted
pregnancy and motherhood in relation to self-overcoming, a concept crucial to discussions of the
Übermensch in Also sprach Zarathustra by Friedrich Nietzsche and foundational for my analysis
of Ellen von der Weiden and Das Tränenhaus. In agreement with Walter Kaufmann -- a
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translator and author of several works on Nietzsche -- I understand the concept of the
Übermensch as a process and state of mind expressive of the term sublimation.
In the context of sublimation as understood by Nietzsche repression serves little to help
the subject deal with society’s expectations. Instead, Nietzsche urges his readers to break with
society’s norms and embrace the Dionysian elements of life that are less concerned with reason
and more with the instrumental function of willing and wanting in relation to self-mastery. Selfovercoming as a form of sublimation is therefore different from Freud’s as well as Lacan’s
understanding of sublimation. But,despite their apparent differences, there are aspects of Lacan’s
concept of sublimation that are useful to our discussion of self-overcoming and the Übermensch,
aspects that will be discussed in more detail below.
Before I address the relationship between Lacan and Nietzsche in terms of sublimation, I
shall introduce another of Nietzche’s concepts with particular relevance for self-overcoming:
amor fati. Indicative of amor fati, or love of fate, as understood by Nietzsche is its
uncompromising acceptance of life, or reality, per se without recourse to metaphysical
categories. Being is not viewed by Nietzsche as an essential matter but as constructed in a
continuous effort to overcome the negative aspects of convention and thereby to situate oneself
as a creator of one’s fate, especially in regard to the apparently negative or unfavorable.
In Ecce Homo, Nietzche writes of amor fati as a state of mind in which the individual has
learned not only to endure what is necessary but more importantly to embrace it as something
good and positive:
Meine Formel für die Größe am Menschen ist amor fati: dass man Nichts anders haben
will, vorwärts nicht, rückwärts nicht, in alle Ewigkeit nicht. Das Nothwendige nicht bloß
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ertragen, noch weniger verhehlen – aller Idealismus ist Verlogenheit vor dem
Nothwendigen –, sondern es lieben. . . . (35)
As an act of sublimation, amor fati continuously repeats itself. To break with conventions of any
kind and be one’s own commander requires that the human subject aspire to behold truth beyond
truth, i.e., the will to power so essential for notions of self-overcoming. Hence, to be an
Übermensch and thus act as one’s own commander, one must not will or want to change one’s
fate yet also never be or become complacent. Contradictory or convoluted as this idea may seem,
any life worth living in Nietzschean terms constitutes a struggle to overcome oneself and the
very conditions that govern life without having to alter life’s necessity. Rather, one must want to
change oneself out of the will to power. Driven by the life-affirming will to power that originates
in the dialectics inherent in cancelling yet preserving the object of one’s desire through
sublimation, the human subject willing and wanting to be an Übermensch becomes a creator. As
a result, no circumstances of life are left to the will of others and/or blind powers as defined by
religion and/or science. Instead, each man is his own god.
Unlike Agathe, the female protagonists Ellen and Cornelie break with some of the
constraints and limitations imposed on them by gender by learning how to live according to
some of the guiding principals of the Übermensch and the notion of love of fate (or amor fati).
Ellen as well as Cornelie is compelled to redefine notions of womanhood by outer circumstances
but also by inner drive and necessity, and eventually they break with previous “idols,” in the
novels embodied by, for instance, their respective fathers, Ellen’s husband, and Cornelie’s lover.
The centrality of the destruction of the connection to God and Christian morals central to Also
sprach Zarathustra consists in Ellen von der Weiden and Das Tränenhaus of a break with
tradition, in particular, the idea of motherhood as an essential feature of women’s life; a notion
that even some female reformers in the historical period of the novels still supported.
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The protagonists’ struggle to create a space for themselves in society as single mothers
ultimately causes them to break with the expectations of their social milieu and situate
themselves as outsiders living on the fringes of society. But, as I will show, Ellen and Cornelie
are empowered by their own suffering, thereby gaining a certain degree of independence.
Reuter’s autobiography suggests that in writing Ellen von der Weiden and Das Tränenhaus the
author borrowed from her own experience as a bourgeois woman trying to create an identity for
herself as a writer, and eventually, as a single mother3:
Wir genossen alle das Gefühl, das Bürgerliche hinter uns gelassen zu haben und in dem
Lande Jenseits von Gut und Böse gelandet zu sein. Aber das Einrichten dort war gar nicht
so leicht, als es aussah, wir Frauen kamen doch zuweilen in arge Konflikte ... Ich war
stiller und bei mir spielte sich der Kampf mehr im Innern und den anderen unsichtbar ab.
Er war vielleicht desto intensiver. Dabei konnte ein jeder vorläufig seine Souveränität im
Gebiet der Freiheit nur geistig genießen, denn das Leben spannte uns alle in harte
Schranken. (451)
As Reuter points out, establishing a life and an identity in accordance with the new challenges
that follow upon the break with bourgeois conventions poses specific problems having to do with
gender. What exactly these problems or concerns may be, Reuter does not say, but they prevent
the female members of the reading group from experiencing freedom other than in the
imagination. A closer look at some of Reuter’s work, however, provides substantial material for
discussion of the situation of bourgeois women in the late nineteenth century and the ways they
may have suffered as a consequence of rigid gender norms, especially in relation to unwanted
pregnancy, which is the main topic of Ellen von der Weiden as well as Das Tränenhaus.
In order better to understand the implications of amor fati for Ellen and Cornelie in
relation to pregnancy out of wedlock, I will elaborate on the relationship between self3

In 1897 Reuter gave birth to her illegimate daughter Lili. The author does not discuss any of the circumstances of
the birth of her daughter in her autobiography, but one may assume that the circumstances of Reuter’s pregnancy
and childbirth informed Das Tränenhaus.
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overcoming, sublimation, and the concept of the Übermensch in a number of texts by Nietzsche,
followed by a comparison between Nietzsche’s thoughts on the Übermensch and Lacan’s
account of sublimation. I will attempt, thereby, to contextualize the suffering associated with
unwanted pregnancy as a human but primarily gendered experience. As I will demonstrate,
gender plays an important role in how Ellen and Cornelie reconfigure notions of agency to arrive
at an understanding of self that coincides with their own beliefs and convictions of what it means
to be a woman and, ultimately, a human being. For Ellen and Cornelie simply to endure their
respective pregnancies does not suffice; they have to embrace their fates in positive terms in
order to overcome them.

1.1 The Übermensch
In the introduction to Also sprach Zarathustra, the fictive character Zarathustra–a hermit and
prophet–proclaims the death of God. Descending like the sun from his cave in the mountains,
Zarathustra starts his wanderings to teach the people about the Übermensch. Upon entering the
first town, he encounters a crowd of people in the square. Men, women, and children, people of
all ages, are gathered to watch an artist walk high up in the air on a rope tied between two
buildings. Zarathustra is able to capture the crowd’s attention for a few moments but as soon as
the tightrope walker appears in the air the crowd turns away from him to watch the artist in
action.
Balancing a long stick in his hands, the tightrope walker slowly approaches the middle of
the rope, suspended over the market place and the people, when suddenly another man appears.
Entering through the same door that the tightrope walker had just come out of, the man–“einem
Possenreißer gleich”–starts following the artist, urging him to move on (22). When he comes to
the place where the tightrope walker stands, the jester jumps over him and hurries over to the
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safety of the other tower. The act of jumping unsettling him, the tightrope walker loses his
balance and falls. The people rush to avoid being hit by the falling body, and Zarathustra alone
tries to console the dying man in his last moments. When the artist expresses his fear that he will
burn in Hell for failing to accomplish more in life, Zarathustra pays him a last honor by offering
to dispose of his body after his death, reminding the tightrope walker about the mortal nature of
both the body and the soul: “es gibt keinen Teufel und keine Hölle. Deine Seele wird noch
schneller tot sein als dein Leib: fürchte nun nichts mehr! … du hast aus der Gefahr deinen Beruf
gemacht, daran ist nichts zu verachten. Nun gehst du an deinem Beruf zugrunde: dafür will ich
dich mit meinen Händen begraben” (22-23).
As an allegory or metaphor for the Übermensch, the tightrope walker is fearless in regard
to the potentially lethal consequence of walking the rope. In the context of self-overcoming as a
form of sublimation the notion of walking the rope marks a transition or change of mind that
takes not only courage but may cost the one who attempts to cross his life. In the eyes of
Zarathustra, by repeatedly risking his life the tightrope walker is a higher being than the people
in the audience and a man deserving of recognition for his bravery. Further, as a potential
Übermensch, in falling down, the tightrope walker symbolizes the fall of humankind and the rise
of the Übermensch, here embodied by Zarathustra, who identifies in the tightrope walker a
potential follower and superior human being. More importantly, however, the fall of the
tightrope walker may serve as a warning to those who watch his fall.
The lesson to be learned here pertains to the importance of sublimation as a form of selfovercoming. As formulated by Zarathustra, “nur ein Possenreißer denkt: ‘der Mensch kann auch
übersprungen werden’” (291). To change from one state of being to another – in Also sprach
Zarathustra symbolized by the attempt on the part of the tightrope walker to cross from one
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tower to the other – requires courage and dedication. Further, one must face the difficulties and
challenges that arise along the way, and not, like the jester, try to avoid them. It is an error to
think one can reach the state of mind and personal integrity embodied by the Übermensch by
avoiding the conditions of human life that pose restrictions and difficulties.
Walter Kaufmann understands Nietzsche’s concept of self-overcoming as discussed in
relation to the tightrope walker as a form of sublimation that depends on “the ultimate
recognition and affirmation of the value of the apparently negative” (253). In order to arrive at a
better understanding of the value of the “apparently negative” to self-overcoming it helps to view
the dialectic suggested by Nietzsche in relation to his critique of body/mind dualism. Rather than
seeing body and mind as representing two opposing or conflicting principles, Nietzsche
understands them as manifestations of the same basic life force: the will to power.
A subject in favor of the apparently unfavorable, the Übermensch represents the ultimate
life-affirming principle for human beings willing and wanting to overcome the distinction
between body/mind. Supported in his actions by passion as well as reason, the Übermensch
makes no distinction between willing or wanting, body or mind. All human nature is spirit and
passion. In the words of Kaufmann, “First he [man] must, as it were, burn a No into his own
soul; he must brand his own impulses with contempt and become aware of the contradiction of
good and evil” (253).
How is the human subject to “burn a No into” his soul? The answer is through great
suffering. Only what causes pain and anguish will not be forgotten. In the course of suffering,
man will understand that Christian morality based on the dichotomy between good and evil has
no bearing in life, since none of these concepts exists in absolute terms. Rather, morality
functions in relation to self-overcoming as an obstacle prescribing conformity and conventional
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behavior, and it prevents the subject from making decisions informed by independent and critical
thinking. To Nietzsche, the subject who strives to create his own ideals is more truthful than
individuals who conform to the norms and expectations of their time.
In the attempt of setting up his own guiding principles in life, the subject striving to
become an Übermensch must break with old idols. In the closing chapter of Book One of Also
sprach Zarathustra, before returning to the solitude on the mountain top, Zarathustra asks his
fellow companions to turn away from him in order to return to and re-create themselves:
Ihr sagt, ihr glaubt an Zarathustra? Aber was liegt an Zarathustra? Ihr seid meine
Glaubigen: aber was liegt an allen Glaubigen? Ihr hattet euch noch nicht gesucht: da
fandet ihr mich. So tun alle Glaubigen; darum ist es so wenig mit allem Glauben. Nun
heiße ich euch, mich zu verlieren und euch finden; und erst, wenn ihr mich alle
verleugnet habt, will ich euch wiederkehren. (115)
The denial of their master on the part of the disciples has a clear biblical reference, especially in
the context of Peter’s denial of Jesus as depicted in the Gospels of Matthew and Luke. However,
denying one’s master and god is imbued with different connotations in Nietzsche’s writings.
Rather than constituting an act of betrayal or retribution, dismissal and rejection of one’s
spiritual leader in a Zarathustrian sense of the word honor the concept of self-overcoming so
central to the Übermensch. By acknowledging the metaphysical nature of the quest for guidance
and instruction, based in many religious systems on the notion of absolute truth, human beings
thirsting for direction in life become agents in their own right: “Das eben ist Göttlichkeit, daß es
Götter, aber keinen Gott gibt!” (Also sprach Zarathustra 296). In the context of self-overcoming,
Nietzsche’s redefinition of truth as a form of self-command serves to inform an understanding of
sublimation as a creative act whereby the individual subject, as stated by Kaufmann, “gives
form” to himself (239). Consequently, self-overcoming, and thus sublimation according to
Nietzsche, constitutes not only the ultimate goal or mission in life but also grants the subject
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creative power to act independently (or in spite) of social, cultural and religious norms and
conventions.
In Jenseits von Gut und Böse Nietzsche contests the possibility that any concept, god, or
deity is higher than the Übermensch. He deems Christianity the number one enemy of free spirits
who, like “guten Europäer und freien, sehr freien Geister” (6), fight “der Kampf gegen den
christlich-kirchlichen Druck von Jahrtausenden (5). Nietzsche encourages these very same
spirits, displaying all the signs of “die ganze Noth des Geistes und die ganze Spannung seines
Bogens,” to redefine their notion of morality in a fashion that points beyond accepted
dichotomies of good and evil, truth and falsehood (Jenseits von Gut und Böse 6).
In order to question and challenge already established conventions and norms the subject
must accept “Die Unwahrheit als Lebensbedingung” (Jenseits von Gut und Böse 6). Here,
untruth is not to be understood as the opposite of truth but more as an attitude toward knowledge
that questions the primacy of truth as the guiding principle of science as well as religion.
Referred to by Nietzsche as “der geistigste Wille zur Macht,” philosophy as presented by “real
philosophers” constitutes an attitude toward science that is critical of the supposedly objective
nature of knowledge (Jenseits von Gut und Böse 11).
In Die fröhliche Wissenschaft Nietzsche states that, contrary to assumption, science – like
religious doctrines – is constituted by a system of beliefs, convictions, and pre-existing
assumptions, without which there would be no science: “nämlich dass es immer ein
metaphysischer Glaube ist, auf dem unser Glaube an die Wissenschaft ruht” (170). Further, he
claims that the faith upon which science rests lies in the importance ascribed to truth as the
guiding principle of all scientific endeavors: “es thut nichts mehr noth als Wahrheit, und im
Verhältnis zu ihr hat alles Übrige nur einen Werth zweiten Ranges” (169). Consequently, truth as
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a scientific concept sets itself apart as the highest of known human values or virtues, whereby the
very pursuit or search for truth becomes an abiding and overbearing attitude, which Nietzsche
calls “unbedingte[r] Wille zur Wahrheit” and “Wahrheit um jeden Preis” (169).
What exactly, Nietzsche asks, constitutes this very need of or will to truth at any price?
The answer is a “destructive principle” or will to death. As pointed out above, in order to
overcome and sublimate one’s impulses and passions one must learn the importance of the
painful and negative in life. To insist on the positive value of all negative experience and to view
it as a source of will power, the subject must be willing to sacrifice everything in life, including
assumptions and facts held to be true, for the sake of truth itself: “nur bleibt übrig zu fragen, ob
nicht, damit diese Zucht anfangen könne, schon eine Überzeugung da sein müsse, und zwar eine
so gebieterische und bedingungslose, dass sie alle anderen Überzeugungen sich zum Opfer
bringt” (Die fröhliche Wissenschaft 169). Thus, to claim to know or behold the truth is a
continuous self-destructive endeavor.
In view of the value or importance ascribed to self-destruction in relation to selfovercoming, Agathe is seemingly one of the most - if not the most - truthful of Reuter’s
protagonists. Unlike Ellen and Cornelie, Agathe suffers self-destruction to the point that she
permanentely loses a stable referent in the world of orderly conduct, thus deteroriating into a
state of mind similar to that of psychotics. The question remains, however, to what extent Agathe
willingly suffers this self desctruction, or if her sufferings are the result of trying to avoid certain
problems or issues that arise from standing up against, or willingly, breaking with gender
conventions and norms.
Recalling the significance of amor fati, or willing what one does not initially want, as
well as the importance of the affirmation of the “apparently negative” to the Übermensch, one
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may ask if Ellen and Cornelie are not more strongly willed than Agathe. As will be discussed in
more detail in chapter three, neither Ellen nor Cornelie are free from thoughts of self-destruction.
Both protagonists struggle to make sense of their respective experiences as pregnant unmarried
women and in moments of deepest despair they contemplate suicide. However, they overcome
their own initial aversion toward their pregnancies in order to institute motherhood as a creative
practice of life-affirmation through suffering. Ellen and Cornelie thereby set themselves apart
from Agathe in that they are able to effect change in their lives.
Nietzsche’s re-evaluation of the concept of truth has an instrumental function in teaching
the subject who strives to overcome himself the purpose and value of self-destruction and
suffering. In Kaufmann’s account, the Nietzschean self-destructive quest for truth is the result of
internal psychological processes borne by a subject in conflict with himself. Ridden with bad
conscience, “man says to himself: my inclinations are damnable, and I am evil. At this point,
man is divided against himself. There are two selves, as it were, one rational and the other
irrational. The one self then tries to give form to the other; man tries to remake himself . . . and to
organize the chaos of his passions” (253).
To maintain a certain level of internal chaos and conflict is one of the main concerns of
the subject striving to become an Übermensch. Only through the re-insertion of uncertainty,
antagonism, and tension into the human soul can he arrive at assumptions that hold until they are
proven false or inadequate. These assumptions can never be true or good in and of themselves.
Instead, initially bad conscience or rather internal conflicts have an instrumental function. Their
ultimate goal is to make the subject aware of the futility of Christian morality, and teach him the
importance of self-command through sublimation.
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Kaufmann offers some insight into the relationship between the concept of self-overcoming in
Nietzsche’s philosophy and how it relates to sublimation by comparing it to Hegel’s use of the
word aufheben. Aufheben is the German equivalent of the Latin word for sublimation –
sublimatio. It is used by Hegel synonymously with the words preserve, cancel and lift up. Simply
put, aufheben represents a process by which the immediate object is cancelled while
simultaneously transformed into another object, whereby the initial substance or substrate is
preserved. Lifting up consists in attaining greater value through the process of change and
modification. However, according to Kaufmann, while Hegel uses the word aufheben to describe
and discuss (paradigmatic) shifts and changes in social and economic systems, Nietzsche’s
understanding of sublimation refers to the individual subject in conflict with himself, resulting in
a re-evaluation of behavioral norms (236).
To Kaufmann, the focus on the individual and psychological in Nietzsche’s
understanding of self-overcoming is connected to the latter’s critique of consciousness viewed as
a separate “thing” or an “entity” apart from the body: “Happiness is envisaged less as a state of
consciousness than as a state of being: as power” (266). Unlike many scholars who assert that
Nietzsche privileges the body over the spirit, thus arguing for a kind of instinctual determinism,
Kaufmann points to the fact that the Nietzschean subject is embedded in nature. This very nature
is spiritual in character, i.e., informed by an understanding of body and mind as expressions of
the will to power and ultimately self-overcoming: “All of nature is imbued with a striving to
overcome and transcend itself, and man cannot be extricated from this total picture” (Kaufmannn
211). Consequently, man is both spirit and nature. More importantly: spirit is nature, and nature
is spirit.
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In the subject’s striving to arrive at a state of mind characteristic of self-command, human
instincts, impulses, and drives are not to be viewed as bad or negative, or as something that must
be fought against or repressed. Rather, in Nietzsche’s understanding of self-overcoming, ultimate
self-mastery and (will) power consist in controlling, sublimating and employing one’s instincts:
“ebenso wenig ist ‘Bewusst-sein’ in irgend einem entscheidenden Sinne dem Instinktiven
entgegengesetzt – das meiste bewusste Denken eines Philosophen ist durch seine Instinkte
heimlich geführt und in bestimmte Bahnen gezwungen” (Jenseits von Gut und Böse 5-6).
In order for human passions to support the subject’s desire for self-mastery, they need to
be controlled or channeled. However, instincts, drives, and other bodily functions should not be
considered primarily instrumental in nature. Body and mind, spirit and reason are equally
natural, and the subject striving to become an Übermensch must break with or overcome
conventions based on the concept of “Plato’s Erfindung vom reinen Geiste und vom Guten an
sich”(Jenseits von Gut und Böse IV-V) as the only means for man to reach his full potential.
Nietzsche uses the term “vom reinen Geiste” in order to critique the privileging of the
soul or spirit over the body represented in the majority of contemporary religious and
philosophical doctrines. The ultimate force or power informing human life and all of nature is the
will to power, and to employ and make use of the will to power, the subject must be what it is,
i.e., nature. Thus, self-overcoming understood as sublimation is not concerned with
transcendence in any metaphysical sense defined by Christian morality. Instead, it is concerned
with the human subject viewed as a unified subject after the division in the body/minddichotomy has been overcome or sublimated.
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1.2 The Will to Power
Nietzsche’s critique of the denunciation of the body in much of Christianity is not to be
understood as an expression of his high regard for human instincts and passions at the expense of
rationality. According to Kaufmann, the primacy ascribed to impulses, instincts, and passions is a
consequence of “metaphysical monism” (239). Nietzsche’s metaphysical monism gives rise to
an attitude of scientific inquiry that seeks to explain any duality in terms of “a single force”
(239). As pointed out above, Nietzsche dubs this single force the will to power. The will to
power is an instinct or force informed by reason as well as passion, and it is representative of the
sum of nature: “so hätte man damit sich das Recht verschafft, alle wirkende Kraft eindeutig zu
bestimmen als: Wille zur Macht. Die Welt von innen gesehen, die Welt auf ihren ‘intelligiblen
Charackter’ hin bestimmt und bezeichnet – sie wäre eben ‘Wille zur Macht’ und nichts
ausserdem. – “ (Jenseits von Gut und Böse 52).
As an intrinsic part of nature, humans are constituted by the will to power. What
distinguishes “real philosophers” and “cynics” from the rest of humankind – including other
philosophers, priests and scientists – is the extent to which they are in command of will to power.
As Nietzsche notes in Jenseits von Gut und Böse, “im wirklichen Leben handelt es sich nur um
starken und schwachen Willen” (27). Due to the nature of the will to power and its status as an
essential life force that exists beyond all dualities and dichotomies, Nietzsche concludes that
humans are neither free nor un-free. Instead, some individuals exercise a stronger will than
others: “Das, was ‘Freiheit des Willens’ gennant wird, ist wesentlich der Überlegenheits-Affekt
in Hinsicht auf Den, der gehorchen muss” (Jenseits von Gut und Böse 23). Resounding in the
background is the master-slave relationship informing Nietzsche’s philosophy.
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Of importance to the discussion concerning the relationship among self-overcoming, free will,
and the will to power is the understanding that Nietzsche sees mainly two kinds or types of
people: slaves and masters, old philosophers and all-too-humans, on the one hand, and the
Übermensch on the other. The Übermensch is the master of future generations of all-too-humans,
who – like slaves – follow the command of a new order of philosophers, referred to as
“Philosophen des gefährlichen Vielleicht” (Jenseits von Gut und Böse 5). These philosophers are:
“Befehlende und Gesetzgeber:. . . Ihr ‘Erkennen’ ist Schaffen, ihr Schaffen ist eine
Gesetzgebung, ihr Wille zur Wahrheit ist – Wille zur Macht” (Jenseits von Gut und Böse 154).
Thus, the Übermensch is a creator of new virtues and values, of which the will to power remains
the highest.
In Nietzsche’s account, as a creator of new values the person commanding himself
obeys himself only: “Ein Mensch, der Will --, befiehlt einem Etwas in sich, das gehorcht oder
von dem er glaubt, dass es gehorcht” (Jenseits von Gut und Böse 23). Far from suggestive of an
anarchic state of affairs or mind, the freedom to act as creator or instigator of one’s own values
and virtues is accompanied by responsibilities on the part of the subject. The potential to and of
self-mastery resides in Nietzsche’s philosophy with a strong will or power to command and
master one’s passions. Termed the “intelligiblen Charackter’” of all (human) life and the guiding
principle of the world, the will to power is a precursor to gaining power, not primarily over
others as their commander and leader but over oneself (Jenseits von Gut und Böse 52). While
many people claim to possess this will, few know how to command and be their own master of
mind and inhibition: “Wer sich nicht befehlen kann, der soll gehorchen. Und mancher kann sich
befehlen, aber da fehlt noch viel, daß er sich auch gehorche!”(Also sprach Zarathustra 291).
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Notice in the quotation the use of the words should, can, and obey. Not only does Nietzsche
suggest that individuals who are not in command of themselves ought to follow the lead of
others, but that they must. The error on the part of the many all-too-humans in believing they can
be their own masters can only be avoided if the ones chosen to command rise to the challenge.
More importantly, the Übermensch is not only required to construct a law or set of beliefs that he
can live by, but he also has to act as his own judge: “Kannst du dir selber dein Böses und dein
Gutes geben und deinen Willen über dich aufhängen wie ein Gesetz? Kannst du dir selber
Richter sein und Rächer deines Gesetzes? Furchtbar ist das Alleinsein mit dem Richter und
Rächer des eignen Gesetzes” (92).
The difficulties presented by acting as one’s own master make commanding more
difficult than obeying, and the human subject who does not know how to overcome himself
cannot lead others: “Dem wird befohlen, der sich nicht selber gehorchen kann . . . daß Befehlen
schwerer ist, als Gehorchen . . . und noch im Willen des Dienenden fand ich den Willen, Herr zu
sein. . . .ich bin das, was sich immer selber überwinden muß’” (166-67). In few passages of
Nietzsche’s writing is the connection between self-overcoming and sublimation as clear.
Constituting both that which overcomes and that which is overcome, I or the subject is the
central point of struggle: “Geist is das Leben, das selber ins Leben schneidet” (151). Thus, the
human subject is the object that is cancelled yet preserved by means of uplifting, or selfovercoming. Further, the result of self-overcoming, or sublimation, is not judged in terms of
good or bad but assessed in terms of more or less (will) power.
To understand better the significance and implication of the will to power to discussions
of self-overcoming and sublimation and how it relates to notions of free will, one should not ask,
in Nietzsche’s words, “frei wovon?” but “frei wozu?” (92). The first question poses a
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relationship between subject and object that focuses primarily on the process or act of a
liberation or movement separating subject from object; the second question asks what follows
afterwards, once the subject has removed himself from the object. As a sequence of actions, i.e.,
what happens after the subject has freed himself from something or someone, the relationship
among free will, will to power, and agency in Nietzsche’s philosophy is more easily discernible
if one thinks of it less in terms of cause and effect, and more in terms of a reversal thereof. The
reversal of cause and effect noticeable in Nietzsche’s writing may be understood both as a
stylistic element and the result of dialectical monism.
Ultimately, the effect of Nietzsche’s dialectical monism is the canceling of the human
subject in favor of the Übermensch: he who is both human and god. The will to power thereby
remains unchanged while the physical manifestation thereof, i.e., the human subject is
transformed into a higher state of being. As a result, some individuals possess more will to power
than others and thus act as commanders. However, those who obey the command of others are
not un-free, but in charge of less will power than their commanders. To believe in the equality of
all human beings is according to Nietzsche the result of sentimental weakness and misdirected
humanity. If allowed to guide human conduct, the will to truth, and ultimately the will to power,
enables some human beings to rise above and overcome themselves. To acknowledge that one is
not (yet) an Übermensch (like the tightrope walker) makes not for an un-free human but for one
less strongly willed. The commander’s role is to help the one striving to overcome himself to
find the way back to himself. Eventually, he will break with his master and follow his own
command.
By replacing the dichotomy of true and false, good and evil, constituting much of religion
and science, with a continuum of self-overcoming as a creative act of willing, Nietzsche teaches
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his readers the destructive powers of all creation. In order to appear as a creator, one must learn
to despise what one loves and love what one despises, i.e., one must practice amor fati, which is
ultimately the consequence of Nietzsche’s dialectical monism: “Was ich auch schaffe und wie
ich’s auch liebe, – bald muß ich Gegner ihm sein und meiner Liebe: so will es mein Wille. . . .
Nur, wo Leben ist, da ist auch Wille: aber nicht Wille zum Leben, sondern – so lehre ich’s dich –
Wille zur Macht” (168). Thus, not to live, but to overcome is the strongest of all forces in life,
equaled only by willing-as-such: “tut immerhin was ihr wollt, - aber seid erst solche, die wollen
können!” (251).

1.3 Women – Slaves and Masters?
On his wanderings to teach man about the Übermensch, Zarathustra encounters an old woman.
At her request, Zarathustra talks about woman, or “Weib” (96). Due to the limited scope of the
reference in respect to Nietzsche’s overall corpus, it is impossible to make any conclusive
remarks regarding Nietzsche’s thoughts on gender. However, if one attempts to determine the
significance that gender holds for the Übermensch based on the frequency with which the topic
is treated in Also sprach Zarathustra, the lack of engagement with the issue is telling. For
Nietzsche, women do not exist in other than negative terms as enigmas: “Alles am Weibe ist ein
Rätsel, und alles am Weibe hat eine Lösung: sie heißt Schwangerschaft” (96).
In Zarathustra’s view, pregnancy and motherhood are the raison d’être for women. Here
he assigns men a merely instrumental function as enablers or supporters in women’s
achievement of their goal. For men, on the other hand, women appear as shining toys, or
“Spielzeuge,” and their role is to entertain men returning from warfare and battle by engaging
with men’s inner child (96). Although women are human beings capable of loving, this love is
better spent on young children than on men: “Der Strahl eines Sternes glänze in eurer Liebe!
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Eure Hoffnung heiße: möge ich den Übermenschen gebären!” (96). Thus, as Nietzsche discusses
in Also sprach Zarathustra, women’s function in society is clear. They are mothers and
wives/lovers. However, if by “Übermenschen gebären” we not only understand the newborn
baby, but the man born again, as an Übermensch, woman is crucial to the coming of the new age
under the reign of Übermenschen. Zarathustra does not convey how she is to support this
development further, other than in her function as a toy; however, the old woman gives the
reader some clues. At the end of their conversation, she gives Zarahustra a piece of advice: “Du
gehst zu Frauen? Vergiß die Peitsche nicht!” (98).
With respect to the exchange between Zarathustra and the old woman, one must assume
that women are not willingly going to submit themselves to the supremacy of men, and
ultimately, the Übermensch. Men, so it seems, are encouraged to use force and violence in order
to subdue women. What kind of relationship this creates between man and woman is difficult to
say. It is not based on trust or mutual understanding, but on personal interest. Men and women
are dependent on each other, and by no means will either of them allow the other to interfere
with their respective ambitions. Ultimately, in Also sprach Zarathustra, Nietzsche encourages us
not to trust women, but to view them as the other subject or sex that must be overcome by the
one aspiring to be an Übermensch.
In contrast to his account of women as primarily instrumental to the Übermensch in Also
sprach Zarathustra, in Die fröhliche Wissenschaft Nietzsche offers a more nuanced
representation of women. Once again, he invokes old women as a feature and topic in relation to
gender. In the 64th aphorism Nietzsche writes,
Skeptiker. — Ich fürchte, dass altgewordene Frauen im geheimsten Verstecke ihres
Herzens skeptischer sind, als alle Männer: sie glauben an die Oberflächlichkeit des
Daseins als an sein Wesen, und alle Tugend und Tiefe ist ihnen nur Verhüllung dieser
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„Wahrheit“, die sehr wünschenswerthe Verhüllung eines pudendum —, also eine Sache
des Anstandes und der Scham, und nicht mehr! (81)
In “Gender in The Gay Science,” Kathleen Higgins argues that the description of the old women
“as taking a superficial stance toward experience as a matter of etiquette” is not to be confused
with a negative representation of women (238). Rather, in the introduction to the second edition
of Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft, Nietzsche portrays himself as a man who, in the words of
Higgins, “has become superficial out of profundity, thanks to the wear of his experiences” (38).
Thus, in line with Higgings’ argument, Nietzsche’s point is not to make a fool out of old women
but to credit them with insights that many men lack. Nietzsche thus questions assumptions by
male skeptics who fail to recognize that profundity and old age are virtues also found in women
Further, in Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft Nietzsche criticizes what he considers a
paradoxical feature in the education of noble women. The title of the chapter is “Von der
weiblichen Keuschheit,” and it concerns the problems women face in regard to chastity as a
specifically female virtue. Given social expectations that they remain uninformed about sexual
matters until the day of marriage, how are women not, Nietzsche asks, to be confused? More
importantly, how are they to deal with the complexities of marriage? The consequences are fatal,
and, as it seems, pregnancy is the only solution to a paradoxical situation: “Die Frauen
empfinden leicht ihre Männer als ein Fragezeichen ihrer Ehre und ihre Kinder als eine Apologie
oder Busse, — sie bedürfen der Kinder und wünschen sie sich, in einem ganz anderen Sinne als
ein Mann sich Kinder wünscht” (83)
In regard to pregnancy, in Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft Nietzsche reiterates the opinion
voiced in Also sprach Zarathustra that motherhood is central to women’s existence. However, as
Nietzsche points out, motherhood serves multiple functions, one of which concerns the idea
brought forward in the passage quoted above regarding women’s need for children in order to
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build both a buffer against man in marriage and a bridge to understand him. Nietzsche’s attempt
to understand motherhood not merely as an expression of female nature but as a consequence of
marriage, which is a paradoxical situation, expresses, in my opinion, a consideration for women
as human beings. This concern may not extend to include woman in the concept of Übermensch;
however, it indicates an effort to question stereotypical presentations of women
In her discussion of gender in Nietzsche’s The Gay Science, Higgings not only dismisses
feminist criticism describing Nietzsche as a sexist and misogynist, but emphasizes his
importance as a “forebear of feminist philosophy” (242). One of the hallmarks of Nietzsche’s
philosophy that he shares with feminist philosophers according to Higgings is perspectivism:
“the view that philosophy can only do justice to human experience by taking perspectival
differences into account” (242). Thus, what to some readers may appear to be sexist jokes or
misogynists utterings in Nietzsche’s writings are rhetorical devices intended to represent and
critique different stereotypical perspectives on gender. Ultimately, Higgings argues, “Nietzsche
also seems interested, at least in The Gay Science, in inducing transformations of consciousness
regarding gender in his readers. While his ultimate goal is presumably neither limited to nor
focused on gender, he takes gender to be a noteworthy case in point” (242).
One argument in favor of Higgings’ reading of Nietzsche can be made if one considers
the fact that Nietzsche addressed a primarily male audience. By using commonly accepted terms
and expressions to talk about women, Nietzsche could lead his readers to believe that he agreed
with them, thereby proving the point made in the first part of Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft,
namely, that realists among men are hypocrites for assuming that they draw conclusions free of
prejudice. Rather, in Nietzsche’s account, these men and informed readers are naïve to think that
they may ever represent or understand their object of inquiry from an objective or truthful
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standpoint. The consequence of narrow-minded universalism and misogyny is to exclude the
plurality of perspectives that constitute the real world.
Whether or not one agrees with Higgings, given the role Nietzsche assigns to women as
mothers and wives both in Also sprach Zarathustra and Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft, it is not
surprising that Reuter’s protagonists use the domestic domain to redefine their positions as
women. By affirming their roles as mothers and wives, however, these protagonists do not
support the limitations imposed on women by their time; rather they critique the consequences of
traditional gender roles for personal freedom and agency. Women are capable, much like the
Übermensch, to summon their will to power to position themselves as conscious agents
knowingly commanding their souls and spirits to overcome life’s obstacles, especially the
“apparently negative” ones. Of importance here is the fact that Reuter employs the clearly
stereotypical application of gender in Nietzsche’s work in order to explore and appraise the
implications and effects of both conformity to and transgression of conventional norms. She
thereby actively adds a gendered aspect to discussions of the Übermensch that Nietzsche himself
may or may not have had in mind when addressing his readers.
Whether or not a rhetorical device intended to challenge stereotypical presentations of
gender, Zarathustra’s regard of men as the only subjects with the potential to become
Übermenschen resonates with the androcentism of the historic period in which Reuter wrote. The
ideals most favored in society are represented by church, state and family as patriarchal systems:
structures that are reflected in the novels discussed in this thesis. In each novel, the conventions
of gender and class appropriate behavior are discussed in relation to one or several male figures
that function as normative and disciplining authorities against which the protagonists measure
their behavior. Failure to live up to the expectations formulated by male authorities causes
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internal conflict and emotional distress, conditions that Ellen and Cornelie deal with in similar
ways. Due to her failure to comply as well as break with the expectations of her social milieu,
Agathe functions as an antihero to inform and warn the reader of the consequences of
conformity. However, in all three cases the female subjects are portrayed as women who are
restricted by and at odds with a gender-specific discourse that assigns them roles as daughters,
wives and mothers but rarely as individuals with the same status and power as men.
The view of women as inherently emotional beings incapable of higher reasoning and
self-command was widespread in the late nineteenth century. In the context of self-overcoming
as a woman’s fight for self–mastery, Nietzsche’s critique of body/mind dualism serves as an
impetus for change. Based on the assumption that women are inherently emotional, one may
conclude that they are human beings capable of much willing and wanting. To be overly
emotional, or even hysterical, does not make for an Übermensch; however, those women who do
not want to follow the lead of men may deploy the will power attributed to Übermenschen by
Nietzsche in combination with self-sacrifice – a virtue especially assigned to women – to
practice the art of self-overcoming. To clarify my point concerning the relationship between
women’s struggle to break with conventions in Reuter’s work and the function of body/mind
dualism in Nietzsche’s writing, I turn to parts of Reuter’s own biography as a prime example.
At the age of thirteen Reuter’s father passed away, and as the oldest child, she assumed
the responsibility for her younger brothers and her increasingly depressive mother. A few years
later the family lost its entire fortune, and in order to support her family financially, Reuter used
her writing talent as a source of income. The money she earned from these publications inspired
Reuter to establish herself as a writer, and in 1890 she moved with her mother to Bohemian
Munich to live among fellow writers. A year later, in 1891, her mother fell severely ill, and
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Reuter was forced to return with her to Weimar. Although mostly generous and loving in her
descriptions of her mother’s lengthy sickbed, Reuter also displays dark moments of resentment
and bitterness: “Oft musste ich das stille weiße Gesicht meiner Mutter betrachten und denken:
Sie hat gesiegt … sie besitzt mich nun ganz allein” (442).
One of few distractions offered to Reuter came from a small local literary scene that
included famous writers such as Rudolf Steiner, founding father of anthroposophy. In the early
1890s this small circle of friends met regularly to read and discuss works by contemporary
writers, such as Nietzche, whose writings left an everlasting impression on Reuter. In Vom Kinde
zum Menschen, she writes, “Nun war Friedrich Nietzsche unser Gott geworden, um den sich wie
Planeten um die Sonne, unsre Geister drehten” (448). All the members of the reading group
viewed themselves as individuals who had left their bourgeois upbringing, or habitus, behind
them, and collectively and individually, they sought to formulate new and radical identities as
human beings, an endeavor that posed problems for Reuter, who had to care for her sick, elderly
mother.
Other than the distraction and entertainment offered by her small circle of friends,
Reuter’s only creative and artistic outlet came from her writing. At this point, in the early 1890s,
she wrote Aus guter Familie. It took her six years to finish the novel, a period in her life
concerned mainly with the wellbeing of her mother: “Wie man sich eine Belohnung gibt,
arbeitete ich zwischendurch an der Lebensgeschichte der Agathe Heidling. Die dunkle
Hoffnungslosigkeit dieser Jahre gab ihr die Stimmung” (444).
My reason for including a part of Reuter’s biography here is not to discuss potential
parallels between the author and fictional characters, in this case Agathe, but to highlight the
perseverance and commitment of a woman who is determined to establish herself as a writer. She
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is forced by outer circumstances to abstain from living among other writers; however, writing
gives her the opportunity temporarily to escape a distressing life situation. It is this same
imaginative power that informs Reuter’s portrayal of women who, like herself, try to navigate
the domains of nature and culture in order to critique society’s construction of gender and its
limiting effects on women.
Further, Reuter, much like some of her female protagonists, is a woman capable of great
suffering. The obstacles presented to Agathe, Ellen and Cornelie are at least partially the
consequence of gender. It is precisely because they are viewed first and foremost as women, and
thus as inferior to and dependent on men, that they must fight for their right to formulate a
meaningful life project. In order to attain the agency sought after they must practice amor fati: a
continuous process of self-overcoming and sublimation that ascribes the apparently negative the
highest value in life.

1.4 Sublimation according to Lacan
As discussed at length in other sections of this thesis, the process of self-overcoming is initially a
self-destructive endeavor that requires the will or desire to sacrifice everything in life for the
sake of overcoming per se. The outcome or result of overcoming may be more or less pain or
more or less pleasure, but viewed separately from the will to power, the subject’s feelings are
insignificant. The will to power is not measured by pain or pleasure but by, in Lacanian terms,
the jouissance associated with sublimation as an act of self-destruction.
Jouissance is Lacan’s term for the kind of pleasure that derives from the transgression of
the incest taboo. Unlike Freud, who believes in complete satisfaction of the drives by breaking
with the incest taboo, Lacan rejects the notion of complete satisfaction. In Lacan’s
understanding, the symbolic prohibition of enjoyment in the Oedipus complex (the incest taboo)
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is, paradoxically, the prohibition of something that is already impossible. The impossibility of
full satisfaction, or jouissance, is an effect of language and thus a principle defining the human
condition. In the words of Carmela Levy-Stokes: “The speaking being has to use the signifier,
which comes from the Other. This has an effect of cutting any notion of a complete jouissance of
the Other. Complete jouissance is thus forbidden to the one who speaks, that is, to all speaking
beings. This refers to a loss of jouissance which is a necessity for those who use language and
are a product of language” (103). The ultimate function of the incest taboo is therefore not to
prevent incest and thus complete satisfaction from taking place, but to sustain the neurotic
illusion that enjoyment would be attainable if it were not forbidden. Further, the very prohibition
itself creates the desire to transgress it, and jouissance is therefore fundamentally transgressive.
The signifier of the Name-of-the Father serves to limit jouissance. It represents the “no”
of the incest-taboo, which redirects desire, and ultimately libido, toward another object. In
psychotic subjects the Name-of-the Father has been excluded from the symbolic altogether, and
as a result they lack referents or objects in the actual world toward which they can direct their
libido. Instead, they turn the libido toward the ego. The ego takes the position of the Other, that
is, the Name-of-the-Father, which causes delusions and hallucinations in the psychotic subject.
S/he is concerned with attempting to achieve full jouissance, which in the absence of the signifier
causes the subject to suffer the pleasures of self-destruction: “In this sense, jouissance is a type
of satisfaction that includes its contrary, exquisite pain. The drive’s satisfaction is a mode of what
is beyond the pleasure principle, a determination by the subject to suffer” (Levy-Stokes 102).
To discuss in more detail the relationship between jouissance and its relationship to
Nietzsche’s concept of self-overcoming, it is useful to compare Lacan’s account of sublimation
with Freud’s view of it. My account is by no means intended to be exhaustive or to provide a
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new perspective. Instead, it serves as a starting point to discuss an aspect of Lacanian
psychoanalytical theory that is complex and not easily understandable to lay readers, among
which I count myself.
In Civilization and Its Discontents Sigmund Freud defines sublimation as the process of
deflecting sexual instincts toward acts of higher social value. It is “an especially conspicuous
feature of cultural development; it is what makes it possible for higher psychical activities,
scientific, artistic or ideological, to play such an important part in civilized life” (79-80).
Accordingly, sublimation is a type of defense mechanism that allows individuals to function in
culturally acceptable ways, possibly resulting in long-term conversion of the initial impulses and
drives.
Jacques Lacan takes up the concept of sublimation in his seminar of 1959-60, The Ethics
of Psychoanalysis. He follows Freud in emphasizing the fact that social approval is central to the
concept. In Lacan’s view, it is only insofar as the drives are diverted toward this dimension of
shared social values that they can be said to be sublimated. However, his account of sublimation
also differs from Freud’s on a number of points. In Das Unbehagen in der Kultur Freud argues
for a relationship between perverse sexuality and sublimation that assumes that a form of direct
satisfaction of the drives is possible in theory and that sublimation is only necessary because this
direct form is prohibited by society. In Das Unbehagen in der Kultur, however, Lacan rejects the
concept of total or complete satisfaction, arguing that perversion is not simply a brute natural
means of discharging the libido and experiencing forbidden sexual pleasures. Instead, Lacan
maintains, sexual perversion represents a highly structured relation to the drives, which are
already, in themselves, linguistic rather than biological forces. Thus, according to Lacan, sexual
drives are not natural or unmediated bodily forces but linguistic representations of desire termed
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signifiers. The signifier represents or expresses the subject’s desire for the Other. However, the
Other’s desire is represented in terms of a signifier as well, and both subjects are unattainable to
each other as subjects. Instead, they appear as objects, blind to each other’s needs and desires.
Freud’s and Lacan’s respective accounts of perverse sexuality in relation to sublimation
posit different object-positions, i.e., understandings of the subject’s relation to the object of
sublimation. In Freud's account, sublimation involves the redirection of the drive to a different
non-sexual object. In Lacan’s view, what changes is not the object but its position in the structure
of fantasy. In other words, sublimation does not involve directing the drive to a different object,
but rather changing the nature of the object to which the drive was already directed, a “change of
object in itself,” a transformation possible because the drive is “already deeply marked by the
articulation of the signifier” (The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 293). The sublime quality of an object
is thus not due to any intrinsic property of the object itself, but simply an effect of the object’s
position in the symbolic structure of fantasy.
Over the course of sublimation the signifier changes while remaining the same, that is,
unattainable. Due to its nature as a signifer an object can be more or less desirable but it remains
unattainable. It constitutes an emptiness or void ultimately pointing to another signifier, or
emptiness. This chain of signification constitutes language and intersubjectivity according to
Lacan and explains why sublimation is another form of linguistic representation. Consequently,
whereas Freud believes that complete sublimation might be possible for some particularly
refined or cultured people, Lacan argues that “complete sublimation is not possible for the
individual” (The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 91). His/her entrance into the symbolic order is
marked by a desire set in motion by the signifier: a desire that can never be fully spoken or
represented, thus excluding the possibility of complete sublimation.
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Lacan follows Freud in linking sublimation with creativity and art. According to Lacan, all
human expression and interaction consists of a play of signifiers but sublimation is different in
that it is connected with the death drive. How it comes about that sublimation is connected with
the death drive is more easily discernibile if one considers the nature of the signifier and the
position of the sublime object in the subject’s fantasy. By being elevated to the dignity of the
Thing – which is the term used by Lacan in The Ethics of Psychoanalysis for object petit a – the
sublime object exerts such a power of fascination that it becomes irresistible to the subject.
Simultaneously, it causes anxiety due to the subject’s fear of castration and annihilation. Hence,
the subject circles around the object of desire. By giving in to desire and attempting the
impossible of attaining the sublime object, the subject dies in a metaphorical sense. Confronted
with the void of the signifier, the subject views himself as the Other views him, i.e., as an object.
To return to and recreate himself as a subject he must fill or subsitute the void of the signifier
with the creative powers of signification. Thus, the death drive associated with sublimation is not
only a “destruction drive,” but also “a will to create from zero, a will to begin again” (The Ethics
of Psychoanalysis 212- 213). In other words, sublimation is a creative process of signification
informed by the death drive in order to overcome self-destruction and annihilation.
The subject that is confronted with the void of the signifier and manages to employ the
creative forces of the death drive has much in common with the Übermensch. Both subjects are
creators who depend on will and the will to power to overcome themselves, and the Other. While
the Other is constituted by the desire for truth in Nietzsche’s philosophy, the Lacanian object of
sublimation is the imaginary object of desire that we seek in the Other. Both objects are subjects
whose desire is represented by the signifier and thus attainable only in symbolic and imaginary
terms. Further, both Niezsche and Lacan claim that humankind cannot exist without the Other.
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The Other, i.e., objet petit a, is any object that sets desire in motion. It is the surplus of desire or
irreducible reserve of libido that defines human subjectivity. Thus, objet petit a is not only the
object of the subject’s desire, but constitutive of his subjectivity.
As established above, the irreducible character of the Lacanian objet petit a is not the
same as the Übermensch. The Übermensch strives to break with convention to set up his own
ideals, thereby creating a plurality of truths and gods. In one of five possible incarnations, the
objet petit a, on the other hand, is the object that fills or covers up the gap between the erotic
bliss of the mythical primordial Father and its fulfillment. Thus, the object petit a is not another
subject but an object invested with meaning. This object evokes desire in the subject, and, in
effect, a surplus of meaning. The excess of meaning associated with the object petit a is
connected to the pleasure that stems from trying to represent and talk about the void at the center
of language:
We meet the object a in language all the time, Miller says, as a function of the symbolic
trying to master the real ... But paradoxically, the continual and palpable emptying out of
the void positivizes itself as jouissance (negative) effects that appear as an excess in an
otherwise smooth glow of symbolization. The excess paralyzes the spontaneous
movement of language and appears as an object a. There one finds a question, an enigma,
or a paradox (Ragland-Sullivan 49-50).
The excess of meaning created by jouissance is both creative and destructive in nature. While it
adds to the pleasure of the Other’s desire, it represents contingency as a permanent condition. In
the case of psychosis, in which the unifying signifier intended to incorporate the real into the
symbolic is missing, the subject lacks the means to cover up the void. Confronted by the lack and
the emptiness of the signifier, the psychotic risks being pulled in and swallowed by the real.
In the case of regular, uninterrupted socialization, however, the symbolic serves as a
vehicle for integration as well as desire, thus urging the subject to engage with other subjects and
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objects in the world. Consequently, as a result of the inexhaustible nature of the void, the subject
is engaged in a continous process of signification that situates him/her as a creator not of
language but of meaning. This approach to signification as meaning-making has certain affinities
with Nietzsche’s understanding of self-overcoming as an uninterrupted quest for truth. On
his/her path to truth, the subject recognizes that truth in itself does not exist in absolute terms but
represents an attitude to knowledge that is characterizied by a destructive principle, “or truth at
any price.” What is being destroyed in relation to truth is not necessarily another subject or an
object but the assumption that truth in itself exists, resulting in a new approach for being in the
world.
In conclusion, Lacan as well as Nietzsche conceive of the subject as both that which
overcomes and that which is overcome. Termed jouissance by Lacan and the will to power by
Nietzsche, human desire is driven or powered by the will or want to create from zero, or start
again, thereby informing subjectivity with the creative aspects of self-destruction. To create is
to confront the void of the signifier. To confront the void of the signifier is to overcome the
object and the Other to become an Übermensch. To be an Übermensch is to create. The chain or
process of signification and meaning making is never-ending, and it is based on self- destruction
as well as the will, and desire, to create new beginnings.
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Chapter 4: Ellen and Cornelie – Two
Übermenschen
Ellen von der Weiden tells the story of a young woman of untamed spirit, who marries an older
doctor and psychiatrist and moves from the countryside to start a new life with him in the city.
Progressively dispirited by the efforts made by her husband to tie her to her wifely duties, Ellen
resists by insisting on continuing to live her life as a free individual even as a married woman.
She entertains a large circle of friends and is often seen as a guest at different social events. As
someone known for her frankness and somewhat unconventional nature, Ellen is often the center
of attention to the amusement of hosts and friends. Her husband, who is not equally amused by
the wild nature and behavior of his wife, dedicates all of his time and energy to his work as a
doctor at a clinic for hysterical women. An expert in the field of hysteria (i.e., female illness) he
expects that Ellen’s wild nature will be tamed once she becomes a mother.
Ellen also nurtures fantasies of becoming a mother. Like her husband, she sees
parenthood as a part of married life that grants meaning and purpose to the institutionalized
relations between man and woman. More significantly, she considers maternity an experience
defining womanhood: “O, ich weiß was mich stillen würde. Nichts Unerhörtes – nein. Etwas so
Natürliches. Ein so alltägliches Glück, wie es arme Waschfrauen, Tagelöhnerinnen,
Pastorenfrauen im Übermaß besitzen. Die Gesegneten! Nur ich allein – ich unter Tausenden
nicht? Kein Anzeichen – keine Hoffnung” (70). With married life not sufficient to nourish a
passionate, wild nature like hers, the female protagonist longs for a baby to give purpose to her
life. She is in despair at the prospect of not being able to conceive (of) a new life, here in a
double sense, both as a pregnant woman giving birth to another human being and as an
individual subject in her own right.
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Ellen continues to struggle throughout her marriage to Fritz. Despite repeated attempts to build a
harmonious relationship based on trust and intimacy, wife and husband drift further and further
apart. At this point in the story, Ellen finds consolation in her newly discovered admiration for
the art of a painter named Uglandy. Visiting an exhibition of his paintings for the first time in the
company of her good friend Jakobus, Ellen is struck speechless. In the following weeks, she
visits the exhibition regularly, and on his first visit to the city, Ellen takes her father to see the
paintings. Once a renowned writer, the elderly man now lives a life in seclusion, unimpressed by
the whims and trends of modern times. The old man does not appreciate or approve of Uglandy’s
art, but in the discussions that follow between father and daughter, Ellen remains a firm defender
of the artist: “Nie habe ich mich so selbst gefunden. Nie war ich so ich selbst, als in meinem
Urteil über Uglandy. Darum hätte ich schweigen sollen” (61).
Ellen, who is aware of her father’s as well as her husband’s views of Uglandy’s art,
knows that by defending her opinion she will antagonize and repel both men. But Ellen guards
the impression of Uglandy’s paintings as an expression and extension of her own self; careful not
to cause animosity or resentment, Ellen oscillates between excitement and despair. In one of her
more heated discussions with her father about art Ellen defends the right of contemporary artists
to find new means and ways of expression, and she labels those who fail to break with
convention imitators and conformists: “Doch einfach abgeschrieben, der edle Stil. Seit
Jahrhunderten abgeschrieben. In der Schule ist Abschreiben verboten, und in der hohen Kunst
soll es erlaubt sein?” (55)
In Ellen’s opinion, the role of art does not lie in mere reproduction as an attempt to
maintain the status quo but in breaking with old traditions. She identifies in Uglandy a man of
new ideals more in agreement with her own ideas, and Ellen rapidly develops romantic feelings
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for the artist. In Uglandy she believes to have found her equal in love and life, and in a moment
of passion Ellen puts together an elaborate bouquet of flowers and leaves it at the door of the
painter’s studio. Much as Agathe’s idealization of the dead poet Byron causes her to tremble
with desire and fear, Ellen’s identification with Uglandy touches on her innermost being.
But, in Ellen’s case, the notion of sublimation is presented as an act of passion and will
that situates the protagonist within discourse and thus the commonly ordered world. Unlike
Agathe, Ellen does not try to break out of or away from language but she strives to find ways to
redefine the realm of representation in order to express her love for another man. Unlike Agathe,
who is willing to confine her desires to the realm of the imaginary, Ellen struggles to achieve real
change in life as an agent of her own making. She is determined to obtain and possess the object
of her desire, and in order to achieve satisfaction Ellen disobeys the law laid down by her
husband, thereby forever estranging him.
When Ellen encounters Uglandy in person for the first time she is taken aback by his
unattractive appearance. Disappointed to the extent that she cannot hide her tears, she leaves the
company without talking to him. A few weeks later during a solitary walk in the dark, Ellen
meets the painter a second time: “Es war Uglandy. Etwas Bedrücktes, Müdes, Trostloses lag in
seinem Gesichte und in seiner Haltung. Nicht der berühmte Künstler, der Zauberer blühender
Farben. Nicht der Siegreiche. Der Mensch, der unter einem schweren, ernsten Schicksal steht. Es
war Ehrfurcht und Zurückhaltung in meiner Seele” (98). Uglandy, who is stripped of his
appearance as a great painter and performer of artistic wonders, now appears as a human being in
need and despair, evoking feelings of compassion and identification in the protagonist. When
they meet again at the wedding of Ellen’s friend Röschen some time later, a spark of passion is
ignited between the protagonist and Uglandy.
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The following evening Ellen forcefully disobeys her husband’s command to stay home. She
climbs out their bedroom window to watch the moon in the company of her friend Jakobus and
Uglandy. While climbing the hill to get a better view, Ellen lures Uglandy deeper and deeper into
the forest until they are finally alone: “Und das weiß ich – weiß es noch heut’! Nehme es nicht
zurück – bereue es nicht! Was geschah in jener Nacht, und was nicht geschah zwischen mir und
ihm, das ist sein Geheimnis und das meine, und niemand sonst wird davon erfahren” (124).
When Ellen returns to her room that night she finds her husband, Fritz, waiting for her.
He informs her that his concern for her is not mainly as her husband but as a doctor, knowing as
he does that she is pregnant. Ellen is struck speechless before passing out. When she recovers
consciousness, she is confronted by her husband, who accuses her of carelessness and
selfishness, whereupon Ellen throws at him the fact that she is in love with another man. Fritz
dismisses her behavior as the result of hysteria and refuses to discuss the topic further. However,
Ellen’s words plant a seed of distrust between the married couple, and shortly after their return to
Berlin, Fritz announces that he wants to divorce Ellen: “Du hast ja vielleicht die Wahrheit
gesprochen…. Ich weiß es ja nicht, und das ist das Schlimmste, daß ich nicht mehr weiß, was ich
Dir glauben soll, und was nicht … Ich würde dieses Kind hassen …. Hörst Du – hassen würde
ich es!” (145).
Ellen too struggles to attach emotionally to the unborn child, but for other reasons than
hatred of her husband: “Und ich hasse das Kind in meinem Leibe, weil es nicht sein Kind ist”
(129). Uglandy, in the meantime, has left the country to get away from Ellen and to dedicate
himself to his art. Abandoned by both husband and lover, Ellen stays temporarily in a hostel until
the divorce is settled.
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In retrospect, after her divorce from Fritz, Ellen recognizes that her main motivation for entering
marriage was in fact to become a mother: “Aus welchem Grund habe ich Fritz geheiratet als aus
dem einer wilden Sehnsucht, Mutter zu werden. Und nun…” (159). Thus, despite her opposition
to the expectations set up by married life in a bourgeois setting it turns out that Ellen, much to
her surprise, wanted a baby just as much as her husband did. But, over the course of her life with
Fritz the longing for a baby turned into despair and at times even hatred and rage. Unable to
connect emotionally to the unborn child, Ellen considers whether ending her life would not save
her and the child from a life of anguish and pain:
Warum nicht ein Ende machen mit dir und mit mir? Wer nicht mehr Zutrauen zum Leben
hat, der sollte von hinnen gehen. Oft und oft denke ich’s. Und sehe nur Barmherzigkeit
gegen mein Kind darin. [...] Eine geheime Hoffnung kauert in einem Winkel meines
Verlangens. Es wird eine Stunde kommen, die mich erlöst. Bald – vielleicht sehr bald ...
Das ist tröstlich. Nicht mehr sein – nicht mehr fühlen – immer nur schlafen – schlafen –
schlafen . . . .(134)
Ellen is prevented from attempting to kill herself and the unborn baby out of a deep-seated
conviction that suicide, especially when one is pregnant, is utterly immoral: “Wäre selbstmord
nicht so gemein …. Und der Selbstmord einer schwangeren Frau ist über alle Begriffe schamlos”
(134). Plagued by feelings of guilt and shame, Ellen is left with no other option than to view the
pregnancy as a test of her endurance, and she suffers the torments of having her body inhabited
and taken over by another living being against her will. Once the baby is born, Ellen dedicates all
of her time to the newborn, which due to his disability needs constant care and attention.
A devoted caretaker, Ellen experiences none of the maternal feelings for her son that she
once harbored with respect to the prospect of having a baby: “Es ist so schauerlich, sein eigenes
Kind nicht zu lieben. Ich glaubte von Stunde zu Stunde, das Muttergefühl müsse wie eine
Erlösung über mich kommen… Nun weiß ich, auch das kommt nicht” (162). Jakobus is
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concerned that Ellen will waste her life in isolation and solitude in the company of her disabled
son and elderly father, and he urges her to break free and go some other place where there are
more opportunities for her to live her life fully. Ellen becomes defensive and upset, and an
exchange follows in which she offers a perspective on the relationship between suffering and
happiness that seems influenced by Nietzsche’s concept of amor fati:
Ich dachte nur, es wäre mehr Roheit in Ihnen. So: Etwa das sich ausleben muss, wie die
Leute so schön sagen.
Jacobus – ausleben heißt doch nicht nur sich ausfreuen. Leben ist doch auch, dem
Schmerz bis in seine tiefsten Gründe nachgehen und ihn ertragen, wo er am dunkelsten
und verborgensten haust.
So viel Christentum steckt noch in Ihnen? O Ellen – Ellen!
In Ihnen etwa nicht? Wenn Sie nichts wüssten von der Wollust des Leidens möcht’ ich
Sie bedauern. – Nur aus tiefstem Herzen sagen können: ”Ich will” nicht “ich muß” –
darin liegt alles. (169)
Ellen does not say “I want pain,” but “I want,” and therein lies the explanation as to why the
concept of the “Wollust des Leidens” or amor fati proves to be so successful or satisfying in the
protagonist’s case. Counter to expectation, by claiming to trade pain for joy, the protagonist turns
the failure of misdirected desire into the experience of happiness and love as a process of
unmasking or overcoming the self in order to perform or stage another self that is free from the
burdens of past or future projections or expectations. As she arises from the ashes of burning
agony and self-destruction concerned with the loss of her husband and lover, Ellen creates
another object of desire: the newborn baby.
In order to replace the other of her desire with the creative, life-affirming act of selfovercoming, Ellen must find her place in life here-and-now by creating ex nihilo. In the words of
Pippin, “In what way, goes the implied question or experiment, can a human being now tied to
the ‘earth’ still aspire to be ultimately ‘overman,’ Übermensch?” (161). The answer to Pippin’s
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question is ultimately amor fati. As Pippin explains, in Nietzschean terms to learn to love what
one hates or cannot endure is a “heroic form of affirmation of life … to re-introduce this
‘tension’ of spirit so necessary for self-overcoming” (162). In Pippin’s statement we see an
understanding of time that points neither backward nor forward but is associated with or locked
into the here and now as the moment of life-affirming decision-making. As a sovereign subject
the individual is situated as a creator or instigator of a time and space in which pain equals
happiness and negation is described in positive terms as an act of heroism.
The moment of recognition causing the protagonist to experience the kind of lifeaffirming tension of spirit necessary for self-overcoming occurs when she watches her son’s
reactions to sun beams playing on his bed:
[...] und da wendet mein Bübchen, das am sonnigen Fenster gesessen, das Köpfchen –
und es lächelt mit den Augen, lächelt mit dem blassen Mündchen und zeigt mit den
Fingerchen auf die goldenen Lichter, die durch die Efeuranken auf sein Deckchen fallen,
und greift mit den Händchen – und will sie haschen und fangen!... […] Mein Kind – mein
Schmerzenskind, mein Sohn! Mein Einziges! […] Ein Laut – der Hauch eines
Ausdruckes – und wieder Glaube, wieder Hoffnung, wieder Spannung und atemloses
Lauschen auf das Glück.” (174)
In Aus guter Familie the metaphor of the sun – in the opening scene described as penetrating the
dark space of the church on the day of Communion – is used as an expression of foreboding and
future change of perspective that causes the female protagonist to tremble. In the closing scene of
Ellen von der Weiden, the symbol of the sun has changed from posing a potential threat to
include notions of self-overcoming. In the reflections of light on her son’s face, Ellen finds the
first signs of joy after months of anquish and pain. Here, the sun as a metaphor for overcoming,
and ultimately amor fati, serves to foreground the role of the son as a source of great hardships
as well as happiness. By accepting her destiny as a mother against her will, Ellen discovers in
and through her son a will to power by means of destruction or self-sacrifice. In those first
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moments of excitement Ellen no longer sees herself primarily as a caretaker but as a mother, i.e.,
as somebody who finds a meaning in life that is beyond herself, yet pointing to the here and now
characteristic of the life-affirming force or tension of self-overcoming.
Ellen’s life having come full circle, the irony of the situation inheres in the fact that the
boy, who is severely disabled, is the main source of happiness in his mother’s life. Before his
birth a cause of pain and self-doubt, the infant is now the past event that helped the mother and
female protagonist understand the limitations of her bourgeois self. While watching him play,
and in anticipation of what is yet to come, Ellen experiences a spark or tension that gives her
cause for joy. One may even claim that it is not despite the son’s disability but because of it that
the female protagonist manages to turn suffering into happiness. Returning to Also sprach
Zarathustra can shed some light on why the notion of disability is crucial in the re-awakening of
Ellen as a subject in her own right with the will to over-come herself and live again.
In part 3 (“Von alten und neuen Tafeln”) Zarathustra announces, “O meine Brüder, wer
ein Erstling ist, der wird immer geopfert. … wir brennen und braten alle zu Ehren alter
Götzenbilder. Unser Bestes ist noch jung” (292). Read in relation to Ellen von der Weiden, the
concept of firstling can be understood in multiple ways. First, one could claim that Ellen herself
is a firstling, not in that she is the first woman ever to be disappointed in love or be abandoned at
the moment of childbirth, but that she is the first among the characters in the text to suffer from
and overcome obstacles related to matters of gender. While there is evidence in the text showing
that other characters, Ellen’s husband and Uglandy included, undergo painful experiences in the
love triangle played out in the novel, none of them goes through such a radical change as Ellen.
Both men continue their respective careers, and as the reader later learns, at the end of the novel
Uglandy marries another woman. The text does not reveal whether Ellen’s husband remarries or
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not, but considering the nature of his position as the supervisor of a clinic for hysterical women
and a doctor with a great reputation, one may assume that he will eventually conform to
conventions that prescribe that men of a certain class and social standing be married. In Ellen’s
case, on the other hand, there is nothing suggesting that she will follow the lead of a man in a
second marriage. Especially the reference to the son as her one and only love or “Einziges” in the
passage quoted above proposes that Ellen has decided to honor her decision to dedicate her life
to her son.
If one considers the anguish and suffering associated with breaking with previous “idols”
or conventions, a second reading becomes possible. Born to parents from the middle class, the
baby is the first (and only one) to be conceived of within the legal framework of institutionalized
marriage between Ellen and Fritz and the first to be born outside of the very same structure.
Further, the son is marked by birth defects never specified but making him unfit for the
expectations of bourgeois gender roles. A weakling in poor health and with limited mental
capacity, the boy will likely never rise to a position of influence, fame, or money, and chances
are he will never reproduce and be a father in his own right. With no career or family to justify
his existence as a man and main provider he lacks the attributes typical of middle-class men like
his father and grandfather. Instead, he will remain in a blissful state of childish innocence, which
in the eyes of his mother grants him eternal life as the chosen one. He, who is unaware of his
surroundings, is lost to the world and free to be his own self, guarded and protected by his
mother. Hence, the boy is a firstling, sacrificed by his father and saved by his mother for future
generations as a symbol of redemption, and ultimately, self-overcoming. As Nietzsche states,
“Eurer Kinder Land sollt ihr lieben: diese Liebe sei euer neuer Adel …An euren Kindern sollt ihr
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gut machen, daß ihr eurer Vater Kinder seid: alles Vergangene sollt ihr so erlösen. Diese neue
Tafel stelle ich über euch!” (297).
In Nietzschean terms, one could argue that the boy is a flawed Messianic figure, born of a
single mother to bring salvation and hope. He is the king of future nations gone wrong and a sign
of his own time. Unable to become the man middle-class society wants him to be, the boy is an
embodiment of a place and time in history that points to a here and now unmarked by past or
future events or expectations. Be it divine bliss or childish innocence, what matters is that the
boy is a man yet unborn and the birthright of a woman born again. Re-birth being the issue here,
both boy and woman, son and mother, enter into a relationship of life-affirming interdependence
by which the birth of the one marks the re-birth of the other.

2.1 Das Tränenhaus
On discovering that she is pregnant Cornelie, much like Ellen, decides to retreat from public life.
But rather than awaiting the delivery of the baby in the company and care of close family,
Cornelie, a well-known author, determines to keep the pregnancy a secret. Cornelie, who
discovers she is pregnant only after she breaks off the relationship with her lover and the father
of her child, quite impulsively and without telling anyone sets off on a journey to a countryside
inn in South Tirol. When she learns that an acquaintance who happens to be in the area plans to
visit, Cornelie – desperate to keep the pregnancy a secret– takes up residence with Frau Ursula
Uffenbacher. Uffenbacher is the owner and manager of an establishment for pregnant unmarried
women, referred to as “das Tränenhaus” by its young residents. Cornelie is eager to remain
anonymous and to find enough time to finish a second manuscript. She asks to have all of her
meals brought to her room, and on leaving the house, she goes on solitary walks far away from
the prying eyes of Frau Uffenbacher and the other women staying at the Tränenhaus. Due to the
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low standard of lodging and food Cornelie is determined to leave the establishment as soon as an
opportunity presents itself. But, informed by the other residents that Frau Uffenbacher is known
for sending incriminating letters to family and friends of her residents out of revenge for lost
income, Cornelie finds herself forced to stay. She wants to protect her mother from the disgrace
that would follow upon a public revelation of her daughter’s condition, and she makes a
conscious effort to endure her stay and focus all of her attention and energy on her writing. With
the revenues from a second book Cornelie hopes to attract good and dedicated foster parents for
her unborn child: “Ihr neues Werk sollte ihr die Mittel geben, um dem unaussprechlich
verlassenen Wesen Freunde zu erwerben, die sich, wenn auch nicht aus Liebe, so doch um des
Verdienstes willen seiner annahmen, es pflegten und groß zogen” (14-15). At this point in the
story, writing as a creative act is viewed as instrumental in that it will help support another life,
i.e., a baby, unwanted by its mother. Thus, initially writing is presented as a means not to
overcome oneself but that other being who threatens to take over the body and life of the female
protagonist.
As is clearly stated throughout the first half of the novel, the prospect of bearing and
delivering the child fills Cornelie with a despair so deep that she at times considers ending her
own and the baby’s life:“Mit dem Kind im Arm an der Kirchhofsecke auf dem öden
windumwehten Hügel zu schlafen schien ihr so süß und friedlich” (103). Increasingly consumed
by the new life growing inside her, Cornelie sinks deeper and deeper into depression, thus
finding it more and more difficult to focus on her work. Eventually she lacks the will to write,
and ultimately to live: “Sie vermochte schon längst nicht mehr zu arbeiten, der Degout auch vor
diesem Werk war zu übermächtig geworden. Sie hielt sich viel auf ihrem Zimmer, lag auf dem
Kanapee und grübelte – sie konnte gar nicht wieder los von den Gedanken und Phantasien, die
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ihr zuflüsterten, wie alles am besten auszuführen sein würde” (107). The importance of willing to
the will to power and the lack thereof and what it means in terms of self-overcoming resonate in
this passage. Recalling Zarathustra’s saying “Do whatever you will, but first be such as are able
to will,” the question here is less whether Cornelie wants to live or die – or maybe both – and
more the notion of willing per se. As the death wish or self-destructive force is instrumental to
the concept of the will to power, one must ask what exactly it is that the female protagonist wills
and whether her will is strong enough to render her successful.
In order to figure out what the nature of her death wish is, Cornelie calls death – in
German “der Tod” or “er” – upon herself: “Er wußte ja, daß sie die Sehnsucht verzehrte, von ihm
geküsst – von ihm in den Arm genommen zu werden. Er wußte ja, daß es damit enden mußte,
daß sie von selbst zu ihm kam” (107). Threatening to steal her breath, and thus to take her life,
death seems to have his own character. Male in nature he asserts such a strong appeal that
Cornelie considers giving in to her desire for him. She longs for his embrace and the kiss that
will seal her destiny. As a body out of reach, he confronts the protagonist with her own desire: a
longing so intense that it consumes her.
The seductive nature of the Other makes for a dangerous play of games between Cornelie
and the object of her desire. Circling around it she cannot decide what to do. Can she give in
without submitting herself to total annihilation or will she succumb to the deathly attraction of
the Other? Ultimately, it is a matter of will power. In view of the emptiness of the signifier, i.e,
the Other, Cornelie must decide if she wants to live for herself and the unborn, or die. It is only
by overcoming her desire for him and the burning sensation of loss that she can create a new
object of desire and thereby live again. In the spirit of Zarathustra, what matters is not pain or
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self-destruction but the will to power, and in order to overcome herself, Cornelie must not fear
anything, not even death.
On the brink of what could be considered a nervous breakdown, Cornelie shows no signs
of psychosis. However, her fascination with death in the first half of the novel exhibits some
similarities with sublimation in the psychotic’s handling of trauma. While Cornelie is not a
psychotic subject she is unwilling and unable to integrate the trauma related to unwanted
pregnancy into the symbolic order. In view of the social stigma of childbirth out of wedlock in
the historical period in which Reuter wrote, it is not surprising that the experience would have
devastating effects on the protagonist. To overcome or deal with her fear and anguish, Cornelie
sublimates her love for the lost lover, and he returns as the imaginary Other, represented as a
lover and redeemer, holding the promise of saving Cornelie and the unborn child from disgrace.
But, as taught by Lacan, in psychosis hallucinations act as a form of sublimation “with
serious drawbacks” (105). These drawbacks include the loss of language and a stable sense of
self. The result is a form of language entrapment isolating the psychotic subject in a world of his
own making. The psychotic’s world as depicted by Lacan has little in common with the notion of
creation in Nietzsche’s philosophy of the Übermensch. To be a creator in the sense of the
Übermensch is an imaginative and liberating act that situates the subject within discourse;
however, the psychotic’s lack of access to the world of communication makes him a creator of a
language that only he speaks. The exclusion from the symbolic is the result of the loss of an
ultimate, absolute referent in the world. In his study of Schreber’s writing, Lacan refers to this
loss of “the guarantor of my being” as a loss of the ultimate sense of self as belonging to the
world: “What characterizes Schreber’s world is that he is lost, and only the you remains. . . . This
he is the guarantor of my being, without this he my being could not even be an I” (101).
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The he referred to by Lacan is ultimately the subject position made possible by the Name-of-theFather. As part of socialization the subject must learn to separate himself from the mother, and
eventually the father and to represent their absence in language. The result is a creation of self
that is always understood in relation to the absence of the Other in the presence of its
replacement, i.e., the signifier. A dispersed, disembodied psychotic subject, however, lacks
access to discourse, and consequently, the means to interact in all but one way: he can determine
when to achieve the un-imaginary by imbuing himself with his self, thereby escaping the threat
posed by the real. The fact that this process or act implicates or brings about the death of the
subject is not of concern to the psychotic. At this point he is lost and only you exist, i.e., the
Other. But what about the I?
The I goes missing as well. As soon as the process of integration into the symbolic order
breaks down or fails, the ego of the psychotic subject initiates a series of defense mechanisms to
ward off the threat posed by the real. Since language constitutes the main tool and effect of
integration, by refusing to talk in any manner comprehensible to other members of the discursive
order, the psychotic subject closes himself off from the world. As a consequence thereof, the
imaginary relationship between you and me, him and God remains intact, protecting the
psychotic subject from facing himself in the Other. With the refusal to recognize the Other as a
product of the I, the psychotic subject remains in a world of hallucinatory signs and subjects
imaginable and comprehensible only to him. To try to make sense of this world is pointless.
Why? Because the psychotic subject lacks access to the symbolic order and does not desire to
communicate with anyone but the Other. To avoid discovering the mechanisms behind the tricks
played by the psychotic mind to cause fragmentation, the subject cannot and will not make sense.
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To ask the psychotic subject to step outside the self-imposed language trap that constitutes him
would cause God or the Other to come back.
By calling death upon herself, Cornelie allows for the kind of disintegration of self
visible in the first stages of psychosis to take place. Rather than as disintegration, one may view
the act of sublimation performed by Cornelie as an attempt at unsettling the stable sense of self
represented by the ego, whereby impulses from the id are given space to roam freely. As a
consequence hereof, Cornelie is free to succumb to her desire, thereby creating a surplus of
pleasure, or jouissance. The surplus is the result of the temporary loss of a stable referent in the
symbolic order, which in turn causes a separation between the imaginary and the real. Due to the
lack of the unifying principle of the signifier, Cornelie is unable to make sense of or understand
the jouissance of the Other.
It should be noted that, unlike a psychotic subject such as Agathe, who is excluded from
the symbolic and enclosed in an imaginary realm of her own making, Cornelie suffers a
temporary fragmentation of self. In Cornelie’s case, the internalization of the Name-of-theFather has been successful in a process of socialization and subject-formation supported by her
professional career as a writer. Thus, Cornelie faces a different kind of language entrapment and
fragmentation from Agathe, yet it is similar to psychosis insofar as she temporarily loses a stable
referent in the world of common sense.
A split, fragmented subject plagued by hallucinations, Cornelie experiences the return of
the real as erratic, dark forces spreading a smell of brandy. Brandy is strongly associated with
bourgeois men and the custom of drinking brandy and smoking cigars after dinner. The brandy
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on the breath of the invisible, hallucinatory Other marks him as a man intoxicated by alcohol and
lust, and his attempts at seizing Cornelie as an act of aggression:
Jeden Augenblick konnte sie gewärtig sein, daß die Hölle, die unten an der gebrechlichen
Türe rüttelte, die rostigen Bänder sprengen und zu ihr eindringen werde – daß das
Fürchterliche, Grauenvolle sie wehrlos preisgeben finden würde. . . . Cornelie fühlte den
Wirbel der finstern, tierhaften Urmächte des Lebens um sich kreisen – er griff nach ihr
empor, riß sie in seinen Schlund – sie sah rote Fäuste durch die Dunkelheit nach ihr
langen, brantweindunstiger Atem umfing sie. (112)
In this passage, the Other shares none of the characteristics of the sublime object, represented as
a lover and redeemer. Nor does he evoke any sensations of lust or desire. Unfathomable and dark
as the void itself, the Other is a force of destruction and animalistic power, and ultimately death:
Und so wurde ihr der Mann schlechthin zu einem Bilde des Todes: Leben zeugend, um
doppelt Leben zu vernichten, nur von einem blinden Drang getrieben, den er selbst nicht
zu deuten gewußt hätte. War das ruhelose Sehnen und Gieren nach Liebe, das sie verzehrt
hatte, all die Jahre ihrer Jugend hindurch, im Grunde nicht auch nur ein Verlangen nach
Vernichtung, als nach der Erfüllung alles Seins? (108)

At the point in the return of the real, the Other is represented as the primordial father who is
also the leader of the hoard. As a result of the temporary lack of symbolic and imaginary
power due to trauma, the Other’s jouissance appears crude and aggressive. Without the
means to signify or understand this jouissance, Cornelie becomes prey to his demands.
However, the surplus of pleasure created by the Other is also a surplus of meaning. This
richness of meaning arises out of the gap between the primordial father’s sexual drive and its
fulfillment. It is represented by the objet petit a, or the sublimated object. Thus, in order to
fight or overcome the lethal attraction of the Other and not to be consumed by the void,
Cornelie must create another object of desire.
Sublimation is one way to approach the void without being consumed by it, however
signification in itself, and thus language, is the very mechanism that situates the subject at a
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safe distance from the void, and ultimately from insanity. With the help of signifiers, the
unspeakable is approached in order to handle what, in itself, lacks meaning. Thus, the
signifier is both that which could potentially confront the subject with the void, as well as the
structuring principle to cover it up by creating an excess of meaning.
To maintain a certain balance between the destructive and creative forces of the void,
and thus allow for socialization to proceed normally, the Name-of-the-Father serves to limit
jouissance. Without it, there is an excess of pleasure, as well as destruction. Is this excess of
pleasure and suffering what is meant by the expression “doppelt Leben zu vernichten” in the
passage quoted above? In the encounter between man and woman another life is produced. When
the man later abandons his lover, the hope of a good life for the unborn child is crushed as well
as the woman’s desire for the lover. Thus the Other as representative of the void appears both as
creator and destroyer.
How then is the relationship between willing and wanting to die related to jouissance in
Das Tränenhaus? Is Cornelie willing or wanting to die, or both? Further, what is the nature of
her death wish in relation to the concept of the Übermensch? Ultimately, longing for the ultimate
and irrevocable consumption of self through identification with the Other, Cornelie seeks to
escape her deepest fear: the pain of (child) birth. Here, childbirth may be interpreted as an
allegory for the relationship between creation and self-destruction so central to the Übermensch.
By Nietzsche termed a desire to “be the child who is newly born,” the subject who strives to be
an Übermensch must want to be a mother, i.e., creator of new values by means of great suffering:
Schaffen – das ist die große Erlösung vom Leiden, und des Lebens Leichtwerden. Aber
daß der Schaffende sei, dazu selber tut Leid not und viel Verwandlung. Ja, viel bitteres
Sterben muß in eurem Leben sein, ihr Schaffenden! Also seid ihr Fürsprecher und
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Rechtfertiger aller Vergänglichkeit. Daß der Schaffende selber das Kind sei, das neu
geboren werde, dazu muß er auch Gebärerin sein woollen und der Schmerz der
Gebärerin. (125).
Initially, Cornelie does not want to become a mother. She sees herself primarily as a writer and
after the pregnancy she plans to resume her life as an independent woman. However, in the
process of mental and physical disintegration as a result of the unwanted pregnancy, Cornelie
cannot write. Thus, the single most important aspect of her life as an independent woman eludes
her, and she undergoes a regression of sorts. When faced with a jouissance so intense that it
drives her to the brink of insanity, the protagonist experiences the symbolic death of her own
self. This annihilation or reduction of self to the status of an object explains why the Other of
Cornelie’s hallucinations appears as fragmented and separated into body parts. Cornelie is
temporarily without access to the unifying principle of the Name-of-the-Father, and thereby the
trauma of unwanted pregnancy appears to be beyond signification and unattainable and
threatening to the protagonist.
Simultaneously, the unborn child is the past event that helps the protagonist overcome
herself and to act as a mother and creator. Here, the term creator signifies Cornelie’s role both as
sole provider and caretaker of the unborn child as well as her position as a writer. As an
established writer, Cornelie differs from Ellen and Agathe in that she has successfully managed
to secure a position for herself as an independent woman. She is not in need of marriage to
support herself or the unborn baby. But, to be a woman and a writer is not enough to break with
convention. As one of few professions open to bourgeois women, writing does not in itself
constitute an act of defiance. Neither does pregnancy out of wedlock. But by combining the two
experiences Cornelie constitutes motherhood as an act of resilience situating the protagonist as a
creator within and of discourse, i.e., as a writer.
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At the beginning of her pregnacy, Cornelie is unable to identify with other women in a similar
situation, and she does not see womanhood or femininity as a shared experience. Rather, she sees
being a woman as an individual, personally lived experience, translated in writing into a text of
self-expression and identity-in-making, characteristic of the human condition. It is not until the
magnitude of public debate caused by her first book reaches her in her self-imposed isolation in
Frau Uffenbacher’s establishment that Cornelie reflects on her position as a woman writer: “Ihr
Name war ein Kriegsruf geworden, den andere nun schon auf ihre Fahne schrieben, mit dem sie,
unabhängig von ihr selbst, freie Bahn und Glück und Erfolg suchten … Da draußen in einer
Welt, die so unendlich ferne lag … Es überfiel sie plötzlich mit jäher Gewalt das Bewußtsein,
erreicht zu haben, wonach tausende von kraftvollen Männern vergebens ringen und kämpfen …”
(204-5). Up until this point unaware of her privileged position as a woman and a writer, Cornelie
enjoys a moment of revelation bordering on exaltation, and for the first time since taking up
residence in the Tränenhaus, she feels the will to write again: “Dort draußen lebte sie ja! War
denn dies alles um sie her nicht nur ein wirres beängstigendes Traumland? Hinaus – hinaus in
das wahre Leben! Zum Kampf – zum Wirken – zu neuen Taten, neuen Siegen! schrie plötzlich
jubelnd ihr erwachender Mut” (205).
The title of her second book is ”Der Seelenzustand des modernen Kulturweibes.” During
her stay at the Tränenhaus, Cornelie has had plenty of time to contemplate the situation of
women of any class facing pregnancy out of wedlock. Sharing the experience of unwanted
pregnancy with other women in a similar situation, the protagonist learns the importance of
solidarity and friendship across age and class barriers. At times utterly helpless and dependent on
the other women in the Tränenhaus, Cornelie experiences a kind of rebirth also in terms of
intersubjective relationships. She develops maternal feelings for some of the younger residents,
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and experiencing a desire to protect them from Frau Uffenbacher’s abuse, Cornelie eventually
comes to identify with the other women, recognizing through her affiliation with them that the
sufferings of pregnancy out of wedlock is a unique female experience.
Further, Cornelie appropriates the position in the symbolic order reserved for the
symbolic father to discuss femininity and womanhood in a time in which women’s access to and
participation in public discourse was limited. Of importance to understanding Cornelie’s
significance as a woman writer with influence on public discourse is the fact that the newborn
baby is a girl. Not a boy and flawed Messiah as in Ellen’s case but a girl, Cornelie’s baby is
represented as a possible heiress and fellow companion in future battles for women’s rights.
Expressing a wish that the newborn be endowed with a strong will and intelligence, Cornelie
recognizes that the life of any woman who strives to be treated as an equal to men will have to
fight for her rights: “Wieder umfaßte ihre Hand liebkosend sein festes, rundes Köpfchen, das ihr
fast das Leben gekostet hatte, und dabei dachte die Mutter: Gott erhalte dir deinen harten Schädel
und einen harten Willen geb’ er dir dazu, denn beides kann ein Weib gebrauchen” (254). While
the girl is not yet a subject capable of sharing the burdens and obstacles of life as a single mother
with Cornelie, her very existence situates Cornelie as a mother within the discourse of public
life. At this point in her life happily willing to face the rejection and disapproval of others,
Cornelie decides to disclose the existence of her baby to the public, thus actively resisting the
conventions of her time labelling unlawful babies as unwanted.
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Chapter 5: Concluding Remarks
Gabriele Reuter enjoyed great success as a writer during her lifetime. Her first novel, Aus guter
Familie, was published in 1895 and it received immediate critical acclaim, making Reuter
famous overnight. In the novel we follow the young protagonist Agathe’s journey from her first
attempts at formulating ideals of romantic love and revolution in her adolescent years until her
retirement from the world as a woman in her early forties’s numbed by electroshock treatment,
and ultimately, the pressures of conformity. Aus guter Familie sparked heated debates in
magazines and feminist pamphlets, equal in magnitude and importance to another one of
Reuter’s (later) novels, Das Tränenhaus.
Das Tränenhaus appeared in 1905, and ten years after the publication of Aus guter
Familie the novel caused a new scandal. The controversy surrounding the book came from the
rather stark descriptions of the conditions in a home for unmarried pregnant women. Some years
earlier, in 1897, Reuter had given birth to her illegitimate daughter, Lili, and the circumstances
of her pregnancy and childbirth may have informed the novel Das Tränenhaus. Although much
was made of the complex relationship between autobiography and fiction in discussions of Das
Tränenhaus, it was not the extent to which the author’s personal life informed her literary work
that shocked the public. It was instead the fact that Gabriele Reuter used her privileged position
as an educated woman of the bourgeoisie to address some of the hardships suffered by women
that scandalized.
As a woman and a writer Gabriele Reuter felt the urge to discuss certain issues from a
female perspective, including the pressures to conform to stale gender conventions and the
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hardships of pregnancy out of wedlock. Her work may or may not have been influenced by
personal history, however it’s beyond doubt that some contemporary writers and intellectuals
exerted an influence on her thinking, perhaps especially Friedrich Nietzsche.
As a member of a small group of writers and intellectuals, in the early 1890’s Reuter read
some of Nietzsche’s texts, including Jenseits von Gut und Böse. The reading had an immense
impact on her, both in terms of how she viewed herself as a woman and a writer. Hardships early
on in life had prepared her for a life of self-sacrifice and struggle. After her father died and the
family lost its fortune, the then sixteen or seventeen - year old Reuter used her writing talent as a
source of income. Throughout her adult life, Reuter continued to support her mother financially
and cared for her when she was ill. The responsibility for the elderly woman restricted Reuter’s
personal freedom; in her autobiography she discusses the strenuous relationship between mother
and daughter and how it influenced some of the sentiment of Aus guter Familie.
As evidenced in Lisbeth Hock’s article “Shades of Melancholy in Gabriele Reuter’s ‘Aus
guter Familie,’” Sigmund Freud’s work on hysteria also had a profound influence on Reuter’s
writing. In many ways, we may read Aus guter Familie as an excursion into female psychology
as understood in contemporary scientific discouse: however, it would be a mistake to reduce
Agathe to a symbol or token of female hysteria. Rather, her character functions as an anti-hero
informing the readers of the dangers associated with conformity and the hardships suffered by
women as a consequence of gender inequality. Reuter’s attitude toward the contemporary
women’s movement was ambigious; she never openly associated herself with the feminists of
her time. In Reuter’s work we encounter instead a strong focus on the individual; an approach to
identity formation and its relationship to human interaction/community very much informed by
Nietzsche’s teachings.
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A common feature of all three female protagonists discussed in this thesis is their isolation as
individuals, making them vulnerable to the influence of a small circle of friends and family. At
the end of Das Tränenhaus, Cornelie understands herself and her position as an unmarried
mother partly in relationship to other women in her situation. The effects of her new
understanding can be seen as the sense of community or belonging she feels, which allows her to
break with some of the expectations associated with her social class, and her family, especially
her mother. But neither Agathe nor Ellen manages to liberate or distance themselves from the
authority of their fathers. It is true that Ellen, unlike Agathe, experiences some sort of erotic and
romantic fulfillment or bliss; however, it is shortlived, and in the end both Ellen and Agathe
reside peacefully with their fathers. For Ellen the chance remains of redemption through her son,
but in Agathe’s case it is unclear if she will ever establish any contact with other human beings
and/or the world outside her father’s home.
All three protagonists share a profound need to find something that can give them the
fortitude to face their futures, and it is the shared need that causes them to seek solutions in
Nietzsche’s powerful concepts. Nietzsche’s teachings, including the concepts of the will to
power and amor fati, prove essential in helping Cornelie and Ellen to redirect and focus all of
their desire onto life itself. Obstacles and problems are overcome by turning suffering into joy;
an approach to life that is not easily copied or understood. Rather than offering a solution to all
metaphysical problems or concerns, Nietzsche’s philosophy should be viewed as the ephitome of
a bourgeois lifestyle that was crumbling under the pressure of the onset of modernity and the
effects of massindustrialization and new urban lifestyles. This shift came with challenges for
both men and women, and Reuter’s literary importance lies in her portrayal of bourgeois
women’s struggle to find a foothold and a place for themselves in a changing world.
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Jacques Lacan’s work may be viewed as a continuation of this process in modern times.
Bourgeoise life in both Germany and France in the nineteenth and early twentieth century was
centered upon the family as the highest principle for structuring society. Women and men who
broke with these expecations were viewed as outcasts or failures, and it took another sixty years
or so for the second wave of feminists to challenge the structures of patriarchy. The work for
gender equality continues today, in the twenty-first century, and those interested in learning more
about women’s history would, I am sure, take some interest in Gabriele Reuter’s work.
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